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 ABSTRACT 
In this study we provide empirical evidence demonstrating a relationship between the 
nature of the assets and the primary market spread. The model also provides 
predictions on how other pricing characteristics affect spread, since little is known 
about how and why spreads of asset-backed securities are influenced by loan tranche 
characteristics. We find that default and recovery risk characteristics represent the 
most important group in explaining loan spread variability. Within this group, the 
credit rating dummies are the most important variables to determine loan spread at 
issue. Nonetheless, credit rating is not a sufficient statistic for the determination of 
spreads. We find that the nature of the assets has a substantial impact on the spread 
across all samples, indicating that primary market spread with backing assets that 
cannot easily be replaced is significantly higher relative to issues with assets that can 
easily be obtained. Of the remaining characteristics, only marketability explains a 
significant portion of the spreads’ variability. In addition, variations of the 
specifications were estimated in order to asses the robustness of the conclusions 
concerning the determinants of loan spreads.  
 
 
Keywords: asset securitization, asset-backed securitisation, bank lending, default risk, 
risk management, leveraged financing. 
JEL classification: G21, G24, G32 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This working paper presents the results of an empirical investigation into the 
pricing of asset securitization issues. Securitization is a technique developed to finance 
a collection of assets which by their very nature are non-tradable and therefore non-
liquid. The central element of an asset securitization issue is the fact that repayment 
depends only or primarily on the assets and cash flows pledged as collateral to the 
issue, and not on the overall financial strengths of the originator (sponsor or parent 
company). In the context of this study, asset securitization is defined as the process in 
which assets are refinanced in the capital market by issuing securities sold to investors 
by a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV). The primary objective of the 
SPV is to facilitate the securitization of the assets and to ensure that the SPV is 
established for bankruptcy purposes as a legal entity separate from the seller (Blum 
and DiAngelo 1997, p.244). Choudhry and Fabozzi (2004, p.5) mention that the 
capital market in which these securities are issued and traded consists of three main 
classes: asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO). As a rule of thumb, securitization issues backed 
by mortgages are called MBS, and securitization issues backed by debt obligations are 
called CDO1 (see Nomura, 2004, and Fitch Ratings, 2004).  Securitization issues 
backed by consumer-backed products - car loans, consumer loans and credit cards, 
among others - are called ABS (see Moody’s Investors Service, 2002). 
Securitization was first introduced on U.S. mortgage markets in the 1970s. The 
market for mortgage-backed securities was boosted by the government agencies that 
endorsed these securities. In 1985, securitization techniques that had been developed 
in the mortgage market were initially applied to a class of non-mortgage assets - car 
loans. After the success of this initial transaction, securitization issues were backed by 
an increasingly diverse and ever-expanding array of assets, including corporate assets 
such as lease receivables and bank assets such as payments associated with corporate 
loans.  
 
                                                 
 
1  Ultimately, all debt obligations in a CDO portfolio can be classified as bonds or loans, although both types of debt 
come in various forms with their own unique characteristics. Generally speaking, bonds are fixed income, tradable, and relatively 
liquid debt obligations issued by an entity seeking external capital in debt markets, be it a sovereign, corporate or financial 
institution. Loans are less fungible instruments in comparison with bonds since they are generally less liquid, and therefore less 
tradable, and will usually be held by a smaller group of investors (lenders) than is the case with bonds (see Fitch Ratings, 2004). 
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 Since then, the securitization market has grown to become one of the most 
prominent fixed income sectors in the U.S. and in fact one of the fastest evolving 
sectors around the world. Securitization can be found both in developed and in 
emerging countries (Standard & Poor’s, 2006). 
Given its increasing importance as a funding vehicle and risk management 
tool, it is not surprising that asset securitization has attracted considerable academic 
interest. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), in perfect capital markets, a 
firm’s financing decisions are irrelevant because they do not create firm value. Thus, 
in line with their propositions, it is irrelevant whether a firm adopts asset securitization 
or not. However, in modern economic views, there are sufficient theoretical 
rationalizations for a firm or organization to securitize their assets: in the light of 
signaling (Myers and Majluf, 1984), (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987), (Riddiough, 
1997), (Minton, Opler and Stanton, 1997), (Plantin, 2004); in the light of avoiding 
underinvestment (Benveniste and Berger, 1987), (James, 1988), (Stanton, 1995), 
(Sopranzetti, 1999); in the light of avoiding asset substitution  (Lockwood, Rutherford 
and Herrera, 1996), (Thomas, 1999, 2001), and finally in the light of avoiding the 
costs of standard bankruptcy (Skarabot, 2001), (Gorton and Souleles, 2005), (Ayotte 
and Gaon, 2005). Ergo, even though asset securitization is costly and would not be 
undertaken in frictionless and complete markets, recent financial theory suggests that 
firms may benefit from asset securitization.  
Several other streams of theoretical research address other asset securitization 
characteristics in addition to demonstrating that firms may benefit from securitization 
in the light of certain market imperfections. Although the vast majority of articles and 
working papers are based on theoretical rather than empirical studies, numerous recent 
theoretical breakthroughs in the analysis of securitization and its use have all yielded 
important insights into the observed structure and pricing features of asset 
securitization issues. Key articles include theoretical studies carried out by Duffie and 
Gârleanu (2001), Jobst (2002, 2003), and Choudhry and Fabozzi (2003) on originating 
collateralized debt obligations; theoretical studies on special purpose vehicles and the 
impact on bankruptcy remoteness, carried out by Gorton and Souleless (2005) and 
Ayotte and Gaon (2005); an empirical study explaining launch spreads on structured 
bonds, performed by Firla-Cuchra (2005); descriptive studies of asset-backed 
securitization and its use, carried out by Schwarcz (1994) and Roever and Fabozzi 
(2003); a theoretical model proposed by Plantin (2004) in which tranching presents 
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 itself as the optimal structure; an empirical study carried out by Ammer and Clinton 
(2004) investigating the impact of credit rating changes on the pricing of asset-backed 
securities; theoretical studies on originating mortgage-backed securities performed by 
Childs, Ott and Riddiough (1996) and Oldfield (2000); an empirical study by Firla-
Cuchra and Jenkinson (2006) investigating the determinants of tranching; descriptive 
studies by Jobst (2005a) on the regulatory treatment of asset securitization; a 
descriptive study on collateralized fund obligations performed by Stone and Zissu 
(2004), and finally a theoretical study by Cummins (2004) on the securitization of life 
insurance assets and liabilities. 
To summarize this section, we believe that the above-mentioned studies 
provide us with a clear understanding of the motivations, structural considerations and 
pricing features of asset securitization. Generally speaking, the asset securitization 
market is composed of asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). The securitization market has 
grown to become one of the most prominent fixed income sectors, and the 
securitization issues are backed by a diverse and ever-expanding array of assets.  
However, despite the markets’ size and their recent growth, the question 
precisely how financial market participants price these securities has been somewhat 
neglected in the academic literature.2  To address this issue, the question constituting 
the focus of this working paper investigates which determinants influence the primary 
market spreads of asset-backed securitization issues. The analysis of the determinants 
concerning primary market spreads of asset-backed securitization issues provides a 
major and highly useful addition to our understanding of the pricing factors which 
indeed characterize fixed income markets.3  
                                                 
 
2  Firla-Cuchra (2005) has investigated the determinants of launch spreads in European securitization transactions using 
a sample of 5,161 observations. The dataset includes all structured finance transactions, but limited to the European market. The 
author documents the importance of the impact of credit ratings and other price determinants on the launch spread. However, the 
study contains a methodological drawback in that neither security classes have been defined nor correlation tests have been 
conducted, which casts doubt on the significance of the findings. 
 
3  According to Gabbi and Sironi (2005), the use of secondary market spreads is to be avoided because loan spreads at 
issuance reflect actual loan prices rather than estimations derived from pricing matrices or dealers’ quotes. Issuance spreads 
provide a more accurate measure of the actual cost of debt and of the risk premium demanded by investors.  
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 The purpose of this working paper is twofold. First, we investigate the impact 
on the primary market spread of an asset-backed security caused by the nature of the 
assets after controlling for other pricing characteristics.4  
Second, this research analyzes these other pricing characteristics exclusively 
for the asset-backed security. The choice of asset-backed securities (ABS) as target 
security class in the empirical analyses is based on two main considerations. First,  
ABS are issued by both financial institutions and corporations; MBS and CDO are 
issued mainly by financial institutions. Second, ABS include a much wider variety of 
assets in comparison with MBS and CDO.  
Five arguments illustrate this study’s contribution to the field of interest. First, 
there is no standard data source for these securities, and therefore few empirical 
studies exist of how these securities are priced. A major contribution of our study lies 
in the assembly and analysis of a substantial dataset describing the characteristics of 
asset securitization issues. Second, the vast majority of published articles and working 
papers related to asset securitization are theoretical rather than empirical.  To the best 
of our knowledge, our study is the first to have conducted a full-scale empirical 
analysis of how these securities are priced.   
As a third contribution, we provide the reader with several explicit estimates of 
spread components that have not been considered by previous empirical studies. These 
factors are related to three main aspects: (i) default, investigated by variables such as 
loan to value, the type of originator and the type of collateral; (ii) marketability, 
analyzed by the type of primary market; and (iii) systemic risk, investigated by the 
country of origin, and finally legal risk.  
The fourth contribution lies in the fact that the determinants of primary market 
spreads are relevant for different classes of capital market participants. Investment 
banks in charge of structuring the technical features of certain issues may find the 
estimates concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the issuance spread by 
security class a useful tool. Second, financial institutions and corporations wishing to 
raise funds in the asset-backed markets may obtain reasonable estimates of the average 
spread that they would face. Third, rating agencies are provided with empirical 
                                                 
 
4  It is important to note that this study is based on issuance spreads. According to Gabbi and Sironi (2005), the use of 
secondary market spreads is to be avoided because loan spreads at issuance reflect actual loan prices rather than estimations 
derived from pricing matrices or dealers’ quotes. Issuance spreads provide a more accurate measure of the actual cost of debt and 
of the risk premium demanded by investors.  
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 information concerning the way their credit risk evaluations are perceived by 
investors.  
Finally, as a fifth contribution, this study not only complements the academic 
literature on the pricing of asset securitization issues, but also adds to the vast 
empirical and theoretical literature that seeks to explain the bond spread over Treasury 
yields (see Duffee (1999), Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton (2000), and Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), among others). In addition, we believe that 
this study’s empirical results also contribute to the growing body of theoretical and 
empirical literature on the role of collateralization other than securitization (see 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Boot, Thakor and Udell 
(1991), John, Lynch and Puri (2003), and finally Gonas, Highfield and Mullineaux 
(2004), among others). 
In the following sections, we shall discuss the results of our analyses. The 
remainder of this working paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the background 
information and hypothesis are discussed. In Section 3 we discuss our data. Section 4 
describes our regression model. In Section 5 we turn to our regression analysis and 
explore each explanatory variable affecting loan spread in our sample. In Section 6 we 
asses the robustness of the conclusions concerning the determinants of ABS loan 
spreads. Finally, Section 7 concludes this working paper. 
 
 
2.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND HYPOTHESIS 
Ayotte and Gaon (2005) have developed a theoretical model which 
incorporates the differential control rights and cash flow rights that various lenders 
receive at bankruptcy. They argue that asset securitization is unique in that it 
maximizes ex-post protection of creditors in bankruptcy. Inefficient continuation of 
the sponsor in a situation of default is hereby reduced. However, the reduction of 
inefficient continuation depends heavily on the nature of assets being securitized. On 
the basis of this argument, the authors expect asset securitization to be the most 
efficient instrument when the backing assets are replaceable only. In a sponsor default, 
replaceable assets can easily be obtained from outside sources at a competitive price. 
So, the sponsor may then have no incentive to file a claim against the SPV to obtain 
the assets securitized, and thus the claim of the SPV is not diluted.  
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However, when the securitized assets are necessary for operations and the firm 
cannot easily replace them by resorting to outside markets, securitization may lead to 
inefficient hold-ups. This result is consistent with the theoretical characterization of 
asset securitization, in that avoiding dilution of the investor’s claim in a standard 
bankruptcy of the sponsor is valuable in a way that is observable in prices. Thus, we 
would expect a higher spread for securities backed by assets that cannot easily be 
replaced. Unfortunately, the sign of the coefficient cannot be determined clearly for all 
assets that serve as collateral for an asset securitization issue, since the assets exhibit a 
wide variety of pay-off characteristics.  
Nonetheless, in particular, we expect a positive coefficient for whole business 
loans and future receivables on the one hand, and a negative coefficient for automobile 
loans and credit card receivables on the other. Two reasons can be given. First, whole 
business and future receivables are secured by a pledge on a unique set of assets and 
therefore considered difficult to replace. Second, automobile loans and credit card 
receivables are relatively homogeneous and relatively easy to replace in a constructed 
portfolio.  
These findings give rise to the following question: do securitized assets that 
cannot easily be replaced have a significant positive impact on the primary market 
spread of an asset securitization issue relative to issues with assets that can easily be 
obtained?  Since we wish to control for other pricing characteristics, such as credit 
rating for example, statistical significance could be poor as the risk inherent to an asset 
type is already reflected in the rating of a securitization issue.  We therefore propose 
the following hypothesis: the primary market spread for securitization issues with 
backing assets that cannot easily be replaced is not significantly higher relative to 
issues with assets that can easily be obtained. 
In order to test this hypothesis we used an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis to model the magnitude of the difference between securitization issues with 
backing assets that can easily be replaced and with assets that cannot easily be 
replaced. We restricted our analysis to our sample of ABS issues for the reasons 
mentioned in Section 1.  
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 3.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
The principal data source used in this study is formed by the data provided in 
Structured Finance International Magazine, published by Euromoney Institutional 
Investor Plc. Structured Finance International (hereafter: SFI) is recognized as one of 
the leading journals and news sources by the foremost market practitioners - issuers, 
investors, bankers and other service providers. In particular, SFI provides data on the 
volume and nature of securitization activities, as well as accurate and transparent 
league tables on the global capital markets spanning Asia, the Middle East, Europe, 
Africa and the Americas. This database contains detailed historical information on 
virtually the entire population of securitization of non-U.S. assets from January 1, 
1999 through March 31, 2005. Our sample contains information on 2,427 ABS issues 
(worth €363.19 billion) and we refer to this as our “full sample”. Because the unit of 
observation is a single issue (single loan tranche), multiple issues (multiple loan 
tranches) from the same transaction appear as separate observations in our database - 
765 transactions, containing 2,427 issues. Although comprehensive in many ways, our 
full sample has three limitations for our purposes. First, it provides detailed 
information on securitization transactions limited to non-U.S. assets and dated after 
1998. Second, we do not have information measuring  credit risk information of the 
originator, such as solvency, liquidity or leverage ratios. Third, some of the issues may 
lack key variables such as credit spread.  
One of the most important objectives of this study is to analyze the impact on 
the primary market spread of an asset-backed security caused by the nature of the 
assets after controlling for other pricing characteristics. In addition, we provide 
empirical evidence concerning these other pricing characteristics that may affect the 
primary market spread of ABS issues. A comparison of empirical studies shows that 
each study employs a different set of explanatory variables in accordance with its 
research objective. Some variables associated with the loan are used in all regressions, 
whereas variables describing additional characteristics differ significantly (e.g. 
Kleimeier Megginson (1998), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001), Kleimeier 
and Megginson (2001), John, Lynch and Puri (2003), Firla-Cuchra (2005), Gabbi and 
Sironi (2005)).  
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 To address this issue, our full sample is categorized with respect to three main 
groups of explanatory variables: A.) default and recovery risk characteristics; B.) 
marketability characteristics; C.) systemic risk characteristic. We divided each group 
into a set of variables that are meaningful for the pricing of asset securitization issues. 
For each group, a set of variables was chosen derived from existing theoretical and 
empirical evidence.  
We selected from our full sample those issues associated with ABS for which 
data on spreads were available or computable. We also screen for complete data on 
default and recovery risk characteristics, marketability characteristics and systemic 
risk characteristics.  This procedure has yielded a sub-sample of 968 ABS issues 
(worth €178.51 billion). We refer to this as our “high-information sample”, while we 
call the larger dataset our “full sample”. Our sample includes issues with six A.) 
default and recovery risk characteristics (credit rating, loan to value, type of 
originator, maturity, credit enhancement, and nature of assets); ten B.) marketability 
characteristics (time of issue, loan size, transaction size, number of tranches,  type of 
market, number of lead managers, number of credit rating agencies, whether the issue 
is a tap issue or not, whether the issue is retained or not, and finally type of interest 
rate), and four C.) systemic risk characteristic  (country of origin, creditor rights, 
enforcement, and currency risk).  
Table 1 compares the pricing characteristics in the full sample of issues 
associated with ABS with the pricing characteristics associated with the newly created 
sub-sample of ABS.  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
We documented an average survival rate of 42.7% from the full sample to the 
sub-sample of ABS issues. Dissimilarity occurs between the two samples with respect 
to the type of primary market (84.0% euromarket recorded in the sub-sample versus 
51.1% in the full sample). We shall run an additional regression for issues placed in 
euromarket and other markets. With this check, we aim to investigate whether the 
relationship between spread and pricing characteristics is different across euromarkets 
and other markets.  
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 Also, the sub-sample is very similar to our full sample in terms of spread, A.) 
default and recovery risk (credit rating, loan to value, type of originator, maturity, 
credit enhancement, nature of assets), B.) marketability (time, size of the tranche, size 
of transaction, number of tranches, number of lead managers, number of credit rating 
agencies, tap issue, retained issue, type of interest rate) and finally C.) systemic 
characteristics (country of origin, creditor rights, enforcement, currency risk).5 So, we 
shall assume that any empirical results derived from the ABS sub-sample may be 
generalized to the larger population of ABS issues. 
 
 
4.  REGRESSION MODEL 
In this section, we subject the high-information sample detailed in Table 1, to 
ordinary least squares regression analysis. 6  Our purpose in doing this are two-fold. 
First we wish to determine the impact on the primary market spread of an asset-
backed security caused by the nature of the assets after controlling for other pricing 
characteristics. Second, we wish to provide empirical evidence concerning these other 
pricing characteristics that may affect the primary market spread of ABS issues. In 
order to allow for a comparison of the empirical results, the proxies we used to test 
which factors affect primary market spread are based on theory. We shall provide a 
brief explanation for each variable below. In line with previous research in this area, 
we estimate the determinants of the primary market spread with the help of the 
following model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
5   For  transaction size and number of tranches, we calculated average and standard deviation, taking into account 
transaction size and number of tranches for each transaction individually. 
 
6  Our model adjusts for heteroscedasticity through White’s methodology (1980). 
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 SPREADi =  αn + ß1 CREDIT RATINGi + ß2 LOAN TO VALUEi + ß3 TYPE 
ORIGINATORi + ß4 MATURITYi + ß5 ENHANCEMENTi + ß6 NATURE 
OF ASSETS + ß7 TIME OF ISSUE + ß8 LOAN SIZEi + ß9 TRANSACTION 
SIZEi + ß10 # TRANCHESi + ß11 TYPE MARKET + ß12  # LEAD 
MANAGERSi + ß13 # RATING AGENCIESi + ß14 TAPi  + ß15 RETAINEDi 
+ ß16 TYPE INTERESTi +  ß17 COUNTRY ORIGINi + ß18 CREDITOR 
RIGHTSi + ß19 ENFORCEMENTi  + ß20 CURRENCY RISKi + εi            (1) 
 
A discussion of these variables (and expected impact on primary market 
spread) will follow below.  
 
4.1 Primary Market Spread 
The SPREAD (primary market spread) represents the price for the risk taken 
on by the lender on the basis of information at the time of issue. In our sample, the 
spread is defined as the difference between the margins yielded by the security at issue 
above a corresponding benchmark. The benchmark is presented in basis points. For 
floating rate issues, the spread (in basis points) is reported as a margin above London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR). 
However, issues have been included in the sample based on The Australian Financial 
Markets Association's bank-bill reference rate (BBSW), the Hong Kong Interbank 
Offered Rate (HIBOR), and the Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (SIBOR). For fixed 
rate issues, the spread is represented in basis points over the closest benchmark of 
matching maturity, frequently reported as a margin above EURIBOR, LIBOR and 
SWAPS. According to Sorge and Gadanecz (2004), these measurements of the spread 
for floating and fixed rate issues have become standard in the loan pricing literature. 
Only various adjustments and refinements are applied in different studies in order to 
capture the comparability of pricing variables across floating and fixed rate issues in a 
better fashion (see Firla-Cuchra, 2005). However, since the spreads of all our issues 
are almost exclusively reported at an Interbank Offered Rate, we do not adjust for the 
risk difference between the benchmarks.  
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 4.2 Expected Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 
The first set of explanatory variables affecting loan spread consists of default 
and recovery risk (group A.). The following factors used here represent default and 
recovery risk characteristics: credit rating, loan to value, type of originator, maturity, 
credit enhancement, nature of assets. A discussion of these variables and expected 
impact on primary market spread will follow below.  
The credit rating of a loan issue is an evaluation of the likelihood of a borrower 
defaulting on a loan. By including CREDIT RATING in our analysis, we can analyze 
the impact of default on a securitization issue. A better bond rating should result in 
lower spreads. This notion is empirically supported by Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and 
Mann (2001), Kleimeier and Megginson (2001), John, Lynch and Puri (2003), Firla-
Cuchra (2005), and finally Gabbi and Sironi (2005), who all find credit rating 
statistically significant. CREDIT RATING should capture the difference in both 
issuers’ creditworthiness and bonds’ seniority and security structures. Needing a 
consistent rating classification, we used the ratings scales as employed by Gabbi and 
Sironi (2005) as shown in Table 2. This classification scheme consists of 21 rating 
scales for two rating agencies: Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, to which we have 
added Fitch as the third rating agency.  
Insert Table 2 About Here 
As part of the process, we collected the credit rating class at the time of 
issuance. If a loan tranche had multiple ratings, we calculated the average of the given 
values, rounded off to the nearest absolute value, as the rating classification.7 We used 
a set of seven CREDIT RATING dummy variables that correspond to credit rating: 1-
2 (CR=1-2), 3-4 (CR=3-4), 5-6 (CR=5-6), 7-8 (CR=7-8), 9-10 (CR=9-10), 11-12 
(CR=11-12), and 13-14 (CR=13-14).  Credit rating classifications above B1/B+ 
(CR>14) are not available. Credit rating 1-2 (CR=1-2) is the omitted rating category: 
it has been dropped to avoid collinearity. A word of caution is needed here, as it is 
                                                 
 
7  Nomura (2003) reported that the National Economic Research Associates’ study on structured finance ratings could 
not rule out the possibility of substantial performance differences among the rating agencies. Likewise, the summary of the 
study’s findings reports that rating agencies agree with each other somewhat less often than might be expected. According to 
Nomura (2003), the study found the greatest agreement between Fitch and S&P, and the least agreement between Fitch and 
Moody’s. 
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 important to remember that the rating scales are inverse scales, so that spread 
increases as rating decreases.  
Given our desire to control for credit protection of all positions subordinate to 
a loan tranche, we  included the LOAN TO VALUE ratio (cumulative level of 
subordination) in our analysis.  
In an asset securitization transaction, the senior-subordinated structure splits 
cash flows into many classes of notes, with each class, or loan tranche, having 
absolute priority in the cash flow over the more junior classes. This structure is 
layered, so that each position benefits from the credit protection of all the positions 
subordinated to it. Typical subordination levels are expressed as a percentage of the 
transaction’s initial principal balance.  
We shall illustrate this with the following example. Using a capital structure of 
two tranches - Class A Junior of €40 million and Class B Senior of €60 million - the 
originator might sell only Class B tranche. The investor would bear the risk that losses 
on the underlying portfolio exceed the cumulative subordination level of 40% (€40 
million divided by the total of €100 million). If losses reached 40%, the Class A 
Junior tranche would be wiped out. Between 40% and 100%, each Euro loss on the 
underlying portfolio translates into Euro loss for the holder of the Class B Senior 
tranche. 
To compute the subordination levels, we manually calculated the subordination 
level for each loan tranche in each transaction that contains more than one tranche. If a 
transaction contains one tranche only, the cumulative subordination level is 100% and 
no subordination exists.8 We also required the size of all tranches in a transaction to be 
available: otherwise the subordination level could not be calculated. We finally 
calculated the LOAN TO VALUE ratio as the value of a loan cumulated according to 
the priority structure divided by the total issue amount of the transaction. The expected 
coefficient sign is negative, as loans with a lower loan to value ratio (junior tranches) 
have a lower expected recovery rate in case of default than loans with a higher loan to 
value ratio (senior tranches) and therefore require a higher return. However, its 
statistical significance could be poor as the loan to value ratio is already reflected in 
the rating of a loan issue. 
                                                 
 
8  If the securitization is structured as a ‘pass-through’, there is only one class of bonds, and all investors participate 
proportionally in the net cash flows from the assets. 
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 The originator is the seller of the assets which comprise the collateral for the 
securities. We included TYPE ORIGINATOR to analyze the impact of the originator 
on the spread. Gabi and Sironi (2002) mention that financial institutions should 
control for the presence of implicit government guarantees not already incorporated 
into the rating of an issue.  
Regrettably, the authors provide no definition of the term ‘financial 
institution’.9 The authors find a negative, both significant and insignificant, 
relationship between financial institution and loan spread.  They argue that the lower 
perceived default risk presented by banks versus the risk presented by non-financial 
firms is reflected in a lower spread. In a similar context, Gorton and Souleles (2005) 
argue that the strength of the sponsor matters in pricing the debt of the SPV. This is 
consistent with investors in the asset securitization markets pricing the risk that 
sponsors disappear and can no longer support their SPVs. 
Information on the originator will help us classify the asset securitization 
issues by type of originator. The listed originator may be the parent company of one or 
more subsidiary companies which actually originated the collateral or sold it to the 
securitization vehicle. Unfortunately, our database does not provide a machine-
readable identification code (i.e. Datastream identification number) for the originator, 
although descriptive information is provided by SFI to match the description of the 
originator to its corresponding classification. Needing a consistent classification, we 
started with the seven types of originators involved in a securitization transaction as 
distinguished by Moody’s Investor Service (2002). These types include corporate, 
bank, finance house, sovereign, public entity, savings bank and insurance company. 
Unfortunately, SFI does not provide full information to distinguish between bank and 
savings bank in our sample. For this reason, we integrated both and classified them as 
one category named ‘bank’.  
We constructed a set of six originator dummy variables that correspond to: 
CORPORATE, BANK, FINANCE HOUSE, SOVEREIGN, PUBLIC and 
INSURANCE.  After we screened the originator description of all our asset 
securitization issues in our database, we assigned each tranche to one of six types of 
                                                 
 
9  Banks are financial institutions that accept deposits and make loans. However, other financial institutions also exist, 
such as insurance companies, finance companies, pension funds, mutual funds and investment banks (Eakins and Mishkin, 2000, 
p. 9). 
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 originators. This screening process left us with 2,289 issues (94.3% of entire sample) 
that we could identify. This is illustrated in Table 3.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
The category CORPORATE includes those credits originated by corporations 
and represents 20.2% of the identified sample (491 issues). BANK include those 
issues originated by financial institutions that accept deposits and use their funds 
principally to purchase financial assets such as loans and securities. This category 
includes 1,083 issues (44.6% of the identified sample). FINANCE HOUSE include 
issues of firms that granted loans to both individuals and corporations, and correspond 
to 541 issues (22.3% of the identified sample). Some of the loans are similar to bank 
loans, such as consumer and automobile loans, but others are more specialized. 
Finance houses differ from banks in that they do not accept deposits and typically are 
finance subsidiaries of automobile manufacturers or of retailer groups. SOVEREIGN 
include those issues booked by national governments and are represented by 35 issues 
(1.4% of the identified sample). PUBLIC are those issues originated by any state or 
local government and count for 120 issues (4.9% of the identified sample).10 The 
category INSURANCE includes those issues made by financial institutions that 
primarily sell insurance. In this category, 19 issues were booked, representing 0.8% of 
the sample. The 138 issues (5.7% of the total sample) not identified are recorded in the 
category not identified. 
We expect to find a negative and significant coefficient for financial 
institutions (BANK, FINANCE HOUSE, INSURANCE) for two reasons: first, 
financial institutions should control for the presence of implicit government 
guarantees that are not already incorporated into the rating of an issue and second, the 
strength of the sponsor matters in pricing the debt of the SPV. CORPORATE is the 
omitted category; it has been dropped to avoid collinearity. 
MATURITY (time to maturity) is measured in years and affects the bond’s 
default risk premium (Merton, 1974). We calculated the time to maturity as the 
difference between the legal maturity date of the issue and the launch date. Three 
                                                 
 
10  In our sample, we have included all asset securitization issues by utilities in the category ‘public entity’. 
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 maturity dummy variables were constructed based on the maturity of the issue: 
LOWMATURITY, MEDMATURITY and HIGHMATURITY. LOWMATURITY is 
1 if the issue matures in less than 5 years, MEDMATURITY is 1 if the issue matures 
between 5 and 15 years, HIGHMATURITY is 1 if the loan matures after 15 years.  
Its expected sign cannot be determined clearly from either the theoretical or the 
empirical literature. Helwege and Turner (1998) argue that a positive coefficient is 
expected as longer maturity bonds require, ceteris paribus, a higher spread. On the 
other hand, Sarig and Warga (1989) find a negative relationship between maturity and 
loan spread. The empirical studies that examine maturity's impact on loan pricing 
show a significant positive coefficient but also an insignificant negative one. Gabbi 
and Sironi (2005) find a strong positive significant relationship between time to 
maturity and loan spread after controlling for credit rating.  John, Lynch and Puri 
(2003) find a positive and significant relationship between high maturity loans (> 15 
years) and loan spread, and a negative and significant relationship for low maturity 
loans (< 5 years), after controlling for credit rating. Medium maturity loans (5-15 
years) form the omitted category. The authors argue that borrowers issuing short-term 
debt may face costly liquidation at maturity, motivating the borrower to choose 
longer-term debt. At the same time, lenders prefer short-term debt to control agency 
problems. As a result, borrowers are willing to incur, and lenders demand, higher 
spreads for loans with longer maturity (see Gottesman and Roberts, 2004). Thus, one 
would expect a positive spread differential for HIGHMATURITY  (> 15 years) and a 
negative one for LOWMATURITY  (< 5 years), relative to loans with a maturity 
between 5-15 years (mid maturity). MEDMATURITY is the omitted category: it has 
been dropped to avoid collinearity. 
In our sample, issues with ENHANCEMENT refer to issues with a third-party 
guarantee in the form of an insurance policy issued by one of the monoline insurance 
companies. Dummy variables take the value of 1 if a loan is guaranteed and zero 
otherwise. These providers guarantee (or wrap) the principal and interest payments of 
an issue. For each issue, we collected information whether or not the issue is 
guaranteed. According to Fabozzi and Roever (2003), for each class of securities in a 
given structure, the issuer evaluates the trade-off associated with the cost of 
enhancement versus the reduction in yield required to sell the security. Thus, a 
negative coefficient is expected. However, its statistical significance could be poor as 
credit enhancement is already reflected in the rating of the issue.  
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 We included NATURE OF ASSETS to analyze the impact of collateral on the 
spread. Ayotte and Gaon (2005) argue that the nature of assets is valuable to creditors. 
The authors provide evidence that asset securitization is the most efficient instrument 
when the securitized assets are replaceable.   
In the case of default of the sponsor, replaceable assets can easily be obtained 
from outside sources at a competitive price. However, when the assets are necessary 
for operations and the firm cannot easily replace them by resorting to outside markets, 
securitization may lead to inefficient hold-ups. Thus, we would expect a higher spread 
for securities backed by assets that cannot be easily replaced relative to ones with 
assets that can easily be obtained. 
Within the ABS classification, there is considerable variation in the nature of 
the collateral pledged. This is illustrated in Table 3. We shall briefly discuss the 
nature of the assets attached as collateral to a particular type of security. According to 
Moody’s Investors Service (2002, 2005), ten asset types for asset-backed securities are 
identified: automobile loans, consumer loans, future receivables, equipment leases, 
credit card receivables, trade receivables, small business loans, aircraft leases, whole 
business, and other.11 After identification of the asset types, we screened our full 
sample and assigned each loan tranche to its corresponding asset classification. We 
cross checked our data with the corresponding information provided by the credit 
rating agencies. We were able to identify the nature of the assets for 100% within our 
entire sample. We constructed a set of nine collateral dummy variables that 
correspond to: AUTO, CONSUMER, FUTURE, CREDIT CARD, SMALL 
BUSINESS, AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT, WHOLE BUSINESS and OTHER. 
AUTO (automobile loans) are loans granted to borrowers in order to finance 
the purchase of new or used automobiles, and are typically secured by liens on the 
automobiles being financed. CONSUMER (consumer loans) are unsecured loans 
granted to individuals and used for different purposes (car, home, equipment, 
furniture, etc.). FUTURE (future receivables) refer to securitization of receivables that 
do not exist. Created as a function of future sales, they are used to finance the time lag 
between the start of an obligation and payment or redemption of the related debt. 
                                                 
 
11  In our sample, the category trade receivables is grouped under ‘other’ since few observations were classified as trade 
receivables.  Trade receivables are unsecured obligations generated when one business sells goods or services to another. 
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 CREDIT CARD (credit card receivables) are loans granted to consumers in order to 
finance the purchase of goods and services, and are generally unsecured.  
SMALL BUSINESS (small business loans) are loans made available for small 
businesses seeking to make capital investments, and may be secured. AIRCRAFT 
(aircraft leases) and EQUIPMENT (equipment leases) are both agreements between an 
owner (lessor) and a user (lessee), whereby the lessee makes a periodic payment to the 
lessor for the use of the product. Equipment leases are considered to be small or 
medium-sized, while aircraft leasing falls under the big-sized leases. WHOLE 
BUSINESS (whole business loans) are granted to a business, and the originator 
intends to repay the loan out of the cash flows generated by its business. OTHER 
(other loans) are issues secured by assets that do not fall into any of the categories 
described above. 
Unfortunately, the sign of the coefficient cannot be determined clearly for all 
assets that serve as collateral for an asset securitization issue, since the assets exhibit a 
wide variety of payoff characteristics. Nonetheless, in particular, we expect a positive 
coefficient for WHOLE BUSINESS and FUTURE on the one hand, and a negative 
coefficient for AUTO and CREDIT CARD on the other. Two reasons can be given. 
First, whole business loans and future receivables are secured by a pledge on a unique 
set of assets and therefore considered difficult to replace. Second, automobile loans 
and credit card receivables are relatively homogeneous and relatively easy to replace 
in a constructed portfolio. Still, its statistical significance could be poor as the risk 
inherent to an asset type is already reflected in the rating of a securitization issue. 
AUTO is the omitted category: it has been dropped to avoid collinearity. 
 
4.3 Expected Marketability Characteristics 
The second set of explanatory variables affecting loan spread is marketability 
of the loan (group B.). The following factors used here represent marketability: time of 
issue, loan size, transaction size, number of tranches,  type of market, number of lead 
managers, number of credit rating agencies, whether the issue is a tap issue or not, 
whether the issue is retained or not, and finally type of interest rate. A discussion of 
these variables and expected impact on primary market will follow below.  
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 TIME OF ISSUE refers to the year in which an asset securitization issue is 
launched. The time of the issue should capture the variations in bond market 
conditions.  
We collected information from January 1, 1999 through March 31, 2005. 
PERIOD I: value is 1 if loan was issued in the 1999-2001 period, zero if not. PERIOD 
II: value is 1 if loan was issued in the 2002-2005 period, zero if not. The first 
transaction recorded in our sample is the securitization of Japanese consumer loans of 
Credia Capital Ltd on January 19, 1999. The last transaction recorded is a portfolio of 
United Kingdom residential mortgages by HBOs on March 16, 2005. Although these 
data are updated monthly, we freezed the sample as of March 2005 for the current 
analysis. Kleimeier and Megginson (1998) found the year of issue (1975-1996 dummy 
variables) positive and significant, suggesting that the more recent the loan, the higher 
the spread. The authors argue that this result could be due to lower demand for project 
finance loans, or a qualitative increase in the riskiness of recent loans. However, asset 
securitization is one of the fastest-growing and fastest-evolving sectors of capital 
markets around the world (Standard & Poor’s, 2006).  In the light of these 
developments, an increase in marketability over time would increase issues’ liquidity. 
Thus, market deepening would imply a narrowing of spreads over time. Nevertheless, 
the sign of the coefficient cannot be predicted with confidence. 
The LOAN SIZE is the natural log of the face value of the loan tranche. A 
higher issue amount is generally believed to improve, ceteris paribus, secondary 
market liquidity. Larger issues are likely to be associated with less uncertainty, to be 
more liquid, and to have more public information available about them than smaller 
offerings. Hence, we would expect larger issues to have lower spreads. Gabbi and 
Sironi (2005) and John, Lynch and Puri (2003) found a negative but not significant 
coefficient.  Gabbi and Sironi (2005) explain that this result could be attributed to 
investors not expecting the liquidity to be affected by the size of the issue, or that 
investors tend to hold these securities to maturity and are therefore indifferent to their 
secondary market liquidity. This evidence is in contrast with the expectation that large 
issues have larger liquidity and suggests that large and small securities issued by the 
same borrower are close substitutes. Kleimeier and Megginson (2001) found that the 
influence of loan size on spread is insignificant for project finance loans but negative 
and significant for other loan samples.  
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 The authors explain that this negative relationship between size and loan 
spread could be due to economies of scale in arranging non-project finance loans.  
In line with this result, Firla-Cuchra (2005) found a negative and significant 
relationship between the transaction size and spread after controlling for credit 
rating.12 The author argues that a positive price liquidity effect is related to the size of 
the entire issue.13 Thus, we would expect to find a negative and significant impact of 
TRANSACTION SIZE (the natural log of the transaction issue Euro equivalent 
amount) on the spread.14 Overall, for LOAN SIZE, no sign can be predicted with 
confidence.  
Each transaction is divided into one or more tranches. For every issue in a 
given transaction, we documented the number of tranches for each transaction. We 
included # TRANCHES to analyze the impact of tranching on the spread. Firla-
Cuchra and Jenkinson (2006) found a consistent and significant negative relationship 
between the number of tranches and the launch spread after controlling for credit 
rating. They argue that tranching allows the issuer to take advantage of market factors 
such as greater investor sophistication and heterogeneous screening skills related to 
asymmetric information. Thus, a negative coefficient of # TRANCHES is expected.  
The # LEAD MANAGERS represents the number of financial institutions 
participating in the loan issuance management group. These include the lead manager, 
any co-lead manager, book runners and co-managers. We collected this information in 
order to analyze any differences in syndicate.  A negative coefficient sign is expected, 
as this would indicate that a larger syndicate is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, a better 
result or lower loan spread. Gabbi and Sironi (2005) found a consistently positive 
relationship, but not significant. Firla-Cuchra (2005) found a weak negative significant 
coefficient. Therefore, no sign can be predicted with confidence.  
                                                 
 
12  The currency of the issue has to be analyzed carefully since the value of a securitization issue is often stated in foreign 
currency. In order to include the issues denominated in different currencies in the analysis, we converted them into Euros. The 
exchange rate used is the average rate of the year the issue was launched. This information was obtained from the Nederlandsche 
Bank.  
 
13  Firla-Cuchra (2005) found a consistently negative and significant impact of the loan size on the spread after 
controlling for credit rating. However, when the total issue size of the transaction is included in the regression model, the 
coefficient of the size of the loan becomes positive and significant, while the coefficient of the total transaction size is highly 
significant and negative. Unfortunately, the author does not provide a clear interpretation of how these results arose. 
 
14  The face value sum of all tranches for a given transaction. 
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 The # RATING AGENCIES represents the number of rating agencies involved 
in rating the issue. Since many larger credit rating agencies offer credit rating advisory 
services, this could create a potential conflict of interest, as the credit rating agency 
may feel obligated to provide the issuer with that given rating if the issuer follows its 
advice on structuring the offering  (The Bond Market Association, 2002). Many 
institutional investors now prefer a debt issuance to have at least three ratings. Thus, a 
negative coefficient sign is expected - as this would indicate that a larger number of 
credit rating agencies involved in rating the issue is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, a 
more accurate rating, thereby reducing the potential conflict of interest and lowering 
the loan spread. However, its statistical significance could be poor as the number of 
credit rating agencies involved is already reflected in the rating of the loan issue. 
TAP is a debt security issued in varying amounts and at different times, usually 
in response to investor demand. For each loan tranche, we collected information on 
whether the issue was a tap issuance or not. A dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
issue is a tap issue, zero otherwise. The term of the bond (issuing conditions, coupon 
and maturity) remain unchanged in general, but the tap price may vary according to 
market conditions. For example, Nomura issued the Unique Pub Finance Plc 
securitization in March 1999 for £810 million, with a tap issuance of £335 million in 
February 2001. With the tap, 677 pubs were added to the original 2,614 pubs. Some of 
these are piecemeal acquisitions, but many are houses that could not be securitized 
earlier. A second tap was made in September 2002, incorporating 888 new pubs into 
the transaction.15 Since tap issues are repeat issues and will allow the total loan to 
grow in size and secondary market activity, we would expect to find a negative 
relationship between the tap issue and the spread. However, its statistical significance 
could be poor as the characteristics associated with a repeat issue are already reflected 
in the rating.  
In our sample, the placement of the securities has to be analyzed carefully 
since issues are either sold to investors in the market or retained by the originator as a 
subordinated interest. For each loan tranche, we collected information on whether the 
originator retains a subordinated interest or sold it to investors, and in what type of 
market.  
                                                 
 
15  To protect the pool against dilution, structured financings typically provide for issuance caps, under which additional 
securities are either not permitted or are permitted only upon confirmation by the rating agencies that the ratings of existing 
securities will not be jeopardized by the new issuance. 
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 The bulk of the demand for our entire sample of issues comes from the 
euromarket, the remaining part is placed on other markets. Since the euromarket forms 
the largest market relative to other markets, in our analysis, we have included two 
dummy variables: one for the EUROMARKET and one for OTHERMARKETS. 
Although stronger primary markets (well-organized) are considered more transparent 
and more organized in comparison with weaker primary markets, no relationship 
between the type of the market and the spread at issue can be predicted with 
confidence. 
The RETAINED dummy variable is a beneficial interest in a securitization 
transaction set up by the originator, absorbs the first losses on the whole loan and is 
inferior or in secondary position with regard to collection in the event of default 
(Childs, Ott and Riddiough, 1996). No clear theoretical a priori conclusion can be 
drawn as far as the expected coefficient sign of this variable is concerned. Other 
elements remaining equal, a negative sign would indicate that the originator is able to 
translate original ownership through a lower spread. On the other hand, a positive 
coefficient would indicate that the issue retained by the originator is related to an 
increase in risk.  
We included TYPE INTEREST to analyze the impact of fixed and floating 
interest rates on the spread. We collected information on whether the issue had a rate 
fixed for the life of the issue, or had an interest rate that fluctuated depending on the 
base interest rate (floating rate issue). We constructed two dummy variables based on 
the type of interest rate. FIXED: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan is 
fixed–price, and zero otherwise. FLOATING: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
a loan is floating–price, and zero otherwise. Since the interest rate on a fixed rate issue 
does not change during the life of the loan, these notes do not fluctuate and are 
typically protected to avoid the risk of rising interest rates. We expect borrowers to 
raise funds at a higher spread through fixed-priced issues rather than through floating-
priced issues. For this reason, a positive sign is expected for a fixed rate issue.  
FLOATING is the omitted category. However, statistical significance could be poor as 
the risk inherent to rising interest rates is already reflected in the rating of the loan 
issue.  
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 4.4  Expected Systematic Risk Characteristics 
The third set of explanatory variables affecting loan spread is systematic risk 
characteristics of the loan (group C.). The following factors used here represent 
systematic characteristics: country of origin, creditor rights, enforcement, and finally 
currency risk. A discussion of these variables and expected impact on primary market 
will follow below.  
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN represents the country in which the assets are 
originated. Country should capture cross-country differences in macro-economic 
conditions that are not already incorporated into an issue rating. Gabbi and Sironi 
(2005) included issues originated in Canada, Europe, Japan and the United States of 
America in the full-loan sample, but found no country statistically significant in 
explaining the loan spread. Thus, we would expect to find an insignificant coefficient. 
However, Hill (1998) argues that structuring the transaction in emerging markets – in 
order to minimize investor’ exposure to political risk - presents a challenge. Although 
the transaction structure minimizes investors’ exposure to political risk, it is not 
eliminated. The authors argue that in the event of a crisis, investors price the risk that 
the originator’s government may attempt to interfere and redirect these payments in 
violation of the security documents.  
In our analysis we constructed a dummy variable based on the country of 
origin. EMERGING: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the issue is originated in 
an emerging market, zero otherwise. DEVELOPED:  dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if the issue is originated in a developed market. We believe that the country of 
origin plays a role in the risk perceived by investors. Thus, we expect to find a positive 
coefficient for emerging markets. However, its statistical significance could be poor as 
the risk inherent to an emerging market country is already reflected in the rating of an 
issue. DEVELOPED is the omitted category. 
Legal risk is important since it incorporates the control and cash flow rights 
various lenders receive at bankruptcy. Ayotte and Gaon (2005) argue that avoidance 
of dilution of their claim in a standard bankruptcy of the sponsor is valuable to 
creditors in a way that is observable in prices. In order to analyze the legal framework, 
we gathered data on the creditor rights in the countries where the assets are originated.  
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 As a testament to the importance of a legal framework, credit rating agencies 
explicitly analyze the ability to take control over the assets exhibited by the investors. 
We measured CREDITOR RIGHTS using La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000) indices. We used five creditor rights variables in this analysis, and 
added up the scores to create a creditor rights index (see Esty and Megginson, 2003). 
The analysis is reported in Table 4.16  
Insert Table 4 About Here 
The creditor rights index runs from 0 (weak protection) to 4 (strong 
protection). Unfortunately, this index presents two problems. First, La Porta et al. 
(2000) indices are based on a single point in time and therefore do not reflect any 
changing legal conditions over our six-year sample period. Second, the index yields a 
number of counter-intuitive results (see Esty and Megginson, 2003). For example, 
Zimbabwe and Egypt are classified as having the strongest creditor rights while 
Australia and the U.S. are classified as having weak creditor rights. In order to cope 
with these counter-intuitive results, we also measured the strength of a country’s legal 
system with the help of Laporta et al. (2000) indices since creditor rights are of limited 
use if they cannot be enforced. In principle, a strong system of legal enforcement 
could substitute for weak creditor rights, since well-functioning courts can help 
investors by management in distress. We measured ENFORCEMENT using La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) indices. We used five enforcement 
variables in the analysis and added up the scores to create an enforcement index. The 
analysis is reported in Table 5.17  
                                                 
 
 
16  Column 1 of Table 4 represents the country of interest. The first variable is no automatic stay on the assets (see 
column 2), preventing secured creditors from getting possession of loan collateral. In contrast, secured creditors can pull collateral 
from firms being reorganized, a right that is of value to them. The second variable is secured creditors paid first (see column 3), 
in other words the assurance that the secured creditors have absolute priority over the collateral in a reorganization process.  
Third, there is restriction for going into reorganization (see column 4), and here creditor consent is needed to file for 
reorganization. Hence, managers cannot so easily escape creditor demands. Fourth, we have management does not stay in 
reorganizations (see column 5), as is the case in the United Kingdom, where the creditors have the power to replace management. 
Column 6 represents the scores to create a creditor rights index. 
 
17  Column 1 of Table 5 represents the country of interest. The first variable is efficiency of the judicial system (see 
column 2), an assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business. Second, the rule of law 
(see column 3) represents an assessment of the law and order tradition in the country.  Third, corruption (see column 4) is the 
assessment of the corruption in government. Third, risk of expropriation by the government (see column 5) gives an assessment of 
the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization. Fourth, likelihood of contract repudiation by the government (see 
column 6) is the assessment of the risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of repudiation, postponement or scaling 
down. Column 7 represents the scores to create an enforcement index. 
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 Insert Table 5 About Here 
The enforcement index runs from 0 (weak enforcement) to 50 (strong 
enforcement). According to La Porta et al. (2000), the first two measures in Table 5 
pertain to law enforcement, with the last three dealing more generally with the 
government’s stance toward business. The results provide a number of strong but 
intuitively more likely results. For example, the Philippines and Pakistan are classified 
as having the weakest law enforcement system, while Norway and Switzerland are 
classified as having the strongest enforcement system.  
And so, in our sample, we measured both the CREDITOR RIGHTS and 
ENFORCEMENT in the countries where the assets are originated. A positive 
coefficient may be expected for issues originated in countries with weaker legal 
frameworks (lower legal risk), and a lower spread for issues originated in countries 
with stronger legal rights. Still, the impact may not be significant since legal risk is 
already reflected into the credit rating of the issue.  
CURRENCY RISK is defined as the risk that is run if the currency in which 
the loan is repaid differs from the borrower's home country currency. Dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if a loan is exposed to currency risk, and zero otherwise. 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2001) found the currency risk to be statistically highly 
significant and positive. However, after controlling for credit rating, the authors found 
a positive but insignificant coefficient. Thus, issues exposed to currency risk have 
higher spreads than issues not exposed to currency risk. However, an insignificant 
coefficient is expected since currency risk is already reflected in the credit rating of 
the issue. 
All independent variables are discrete with the exception of credit rating,  loan 
to value, maturity, loan tranche size, transaction size, number of tranches, number of 
lead managers, number of credit rating agencies, creditor rights and finally 
enforcement, all of which are continuous. The results for the spread regressions are 
included in the next section. 
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 5.  REGRESSION RESULTS 
This section reports the results of Regression #1 of Table 6. These empirical 
results present collateral and other pricing characteristics that affect the primary 
market spread for the sample of 968 ABS. They are analyzed for two reasons. The 
first is to investigate whether securitized assets that cannot easily be replaced have a 
significant positive impact on the primary market spread relative to assets that can 
easily be obtained. The second reason is to analyze the other pricing characteristics 
that emerge as important measures for the primary market spread of an ABS issue.  
Insert Table 6 About Here 
F tests for whether the coefficients are jointly different from zero as well as 
adjusted R2 are reported at the bottom of the table. Variations in the specifications 
reported in column 1 of Table 6 were estimated in order to asses the robustness of the 
conclusions concerning the determinants of the primary market spreads of ABS. The 
robustness checks will be discussed in detail in Section 6. 
 
5.1  Determinants of Asset-Backed Securities 
In this subsection, the results of Regression #1 of Table 6 are discussed. This 
analysis starts with A.) default and recovery risk characteristics, followed by B.) the 
expected marketability characteristics of the loan and C.) systemic risk characteristics. 
We shall start with the analysis regarding the impact of the nature of assets on the 
spread associated with the default and recovery risk characteristics category.  
 
5.1.A.  Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 
Ayotte and Gaon (2005) argued that asset securitization is most efficient when 
the backing assets are replaceable only. In a sponsor default, replaceable assets can 
easily be obtained from outside sources at a competitive price. However, when the 
securitized assets are necessary for operations and the firm cannot easily replace them 
by resorting to outside markets, securitization may lead to inefficient hold-ups. Thus, 
we would expect a higher spread for securities backed by assets that cannot easily be 
replaced.  
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 Unfortunately, the sign of the coefficient cannot be determined clearly for all 
assets that serve as collateral for an asset securitization issue, since the assets exhibit a 
wide variety of payoff characteristics.  
Nonetheless, in particular, we expect a positive coefficient for whole business 
loans and future receivables on the one hand, and a negative coefficient for automobile 
loans and credit card receivables on the other. However, since we wish to control for 
other pricing characteristics, such as credit rating for example, statistical significance 
could be poor as the risk inherent to an asset type is already reflected in the rating of a 
securitization issue. The opposite is in fact true. We found many collateral dummy 
variables with statistically significant positive (CONSUMER, FUTURE, AIRCRAFT 
LEASE, EQUIPMENT LEASE, OTHER, WHOLE BUSINESS) or negative 
(CREDIT CARD) coefficients. Lenders demand up to 61.6 basis points as a premium. 
This result is relatively surprising as ratings should already have captured differences 
in collateral’s ability to repay interest and principal in a worst-case scenario.  
Our empirical findings concerning the nature of the assets trigger two 
considerations. First, the primary market spread for securitization issues with backing 
assets that cannot easily be replaced is on average significantly higher relative to 
issues with assets that can easily be obtained. Therefore, we reject the hypothesis. At 
the one end of the spectrum, we have whole business loans (WHOLE BUSINESS) and 
future receivables (FUTURE) that show a dramatic and significant increase in the 
average spread relative to automobile loans (AUTO) and that are therefore considered 
more risky. This can be explained by the fact that both whole business loans and 
future receivables are associated with unique assets that cannot easily be replaced by 
the originator. At the other end of the spectrum, we have credit card receivables 
(CREDIT CARD) that report a significant decrease in spread relative to automobile 
loans and that are considered less risky. Credit card receivables are loans granted to 
consumers in order to finance the purchase of goods and services, and are, in fact, 
relatively easy to replace in a constructed portfolio.  
Second, the average credit ratings may not provide unbiased estimates of 
expected recovery rates. An intriguing explanation for the relationship between spread 
and the nature of assets might be that rating agencies fail to fully incorporate 
managerial incentives when assigning ratings (see John, Lynch, and Puri, 2003).  
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 In particular, if the collateralized debt is secured on an asset value which is 
difficult to destroy, agency problems reduce expected payoff less than the payoff of 
collateralized debt secured on an asset value that is less difficult to destroy. In our 
analysis, a constructed portfolio of future receivables and of whole business may be 
considered relatively sensitive to managerial incentives, whereas a portfolio of credit 
card receivables and automobile loans might not be. For example, the originator 
intends to repay the securities associated with future receivables and whole business 
out of the cash flows generated from its operating assets, while the repayment 
associated with automobile loans and credit card receivables depends on the ability of 
many consumers to repay their loan. As a result, agency problems may reduce 
expected payoff more in the case of whole business and future receivables than they 
would reduce payoff related to automobile loans and credit card receivables. Thus, if 
rating agencies fail to fully incorporate managerial incentives when assigning ratings, 
lenders are enticed to participate by being offered higher spreads for securities 
considered to be relatively more sensitive to managerial incentives, and lower spreads 
for securities considered to be the least sensitive.  
We shall now start with the analysis of the impact of other default and 
recovery risk characteristics on spread. Almost all CREDIT RATING dummies are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and the pattern presented by the coefficient 
dummies indicates that spreads rise when ratings worsen. LOAN TO VALUE has a 
negative significant coefficient. On average, a 1% increase in the level of 
subordination decreases spread by 24.8 basis points. This finding is consistent with the 
fact that issues with a higher loan to value ratio require a lower spread, though this is 
still surprising as credit ratings should capture differences in expected recovery rates 
in case of default. The FINANCE HOUSE and SOVEREIGN dummy variables have 
statistically significant negative coefficients, and the INSURANCE dummy reports a 
positive significant coefficient.  Neither the BANK nor the PUBLIC dummies are 
statistically significant.  
Although these results clearly suggest that the strength of the sponsor matters 
when pricing the debt of the SPV, financial institutions per se do not report a 
significantly different average spread in comparison to the spread of corporates. We 
can offer two possible explanations for these results.  
 30
 First, it could be the case that finance houses and sovereign borrowers have 
relatively stronger institutional features (size, riskiness of operations, reputation etc.) 
that act to decrease loan spread relative to the loan spread charged to corporate 
borrowers: by 29.9 basis points for sovereign borrowers and 17.4 basis points for 
finance houses. Second, spread charged to insurance borrowers is relatively higher 
than the spread charged to corporates: by an average 112.9 in our analysis, because - 
in general - the assets originated by insurance companies chosen as “collateralizable” 
happen to be relatively riskier than average. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that the 
nature of the originator is a significant determinant of the spread, besides credit rating 
and other characteristics.  
The LOWMATURITY and HIGHMATURITY dummy variables both have 
coefficients with the expected signs, but the low maturity dummy is insignificant. As 
was expected, borrowers are willing to incur, and lenders demand, higher spreads 
(10.8 basis points) for loans with longer maturity. Thus, long-tenor issues are 
prohibitively more expensive, even after controlling for the nature of the assets and 
credit rating. Surprisingly, the ENHANCEMENT dummy variable has a negative 
significant coefficient. The use of credit enhancement does in fact decrease spread by 
22.1 basis points. The most logical interpretation of this particular result is that 
investors require a lower risk premium than the premium implicit in the upgrading 
applied by rating agencies.  Nevertheless, this result is still surprising.  
 
5.1.B.  Marketability Characteristics 
The PERIOD II dummy variable has a weak, statistically significant negative 
coefficient, indicating that an increase in marketability over time would, in fact, imply 
a narrowing of spreads (by -8.2 basis points) over time. LOAN SIZE has a positive 
coefficient, although not significant. TRANSACTION SIZE has a negative 
coefficient, although not statistically significant either. These insignificant results may 
stem from the wide variety of collateral taken into account in the regression analysis, 
since the severity of illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity to the issuer's private 
information as shown by the value of collateral (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999).  
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 # TRANCHES is not statistically significant. Thus, we do not find support for 
a significant positive relationship between the number of tranches and the pricing of 
securities after controlling for credit rating and other pricing characteristics. The 
EUROMARKET dummy variable has a positive significant coefficient, indicating that 
those issues placed in euromarkets have higher spreads (14.1 basis points) than issues 
placed in other markets. This result may stem from the fact that the euromarket forms 
the largest market by far, relative to other markets. Differences in liquidity and credit 
standing of Treasury issues could explain why issues placed on the euromarket have 
higher spreads relative to the issues placed on other markets. 
 # LEAD MANAGERS indicates that booking a loan with an original number 
of lead managers of one more reduces average spread by 7.8 basis points. # RATING 
AGENCIES has a negative coefficient and is not significant. Thus, we do not find 
significant evidence to prove that an increase in the number of credit rating agencies 
involved in rating the issue is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, a lower spread.  
The TAP dummy variable has a positive insignificant coefficient, indicating 
that growth in secondary market activity may already be incorporated into the credit 
rating of the issue. The FIXED dummy variable is significant and positive. Lenders 
demand an average premium of 21.5 basis points for fixed rate credits in comparison 
with floating rate credits. This result is consistent with the expectation that - on 
average - borrowers manage to raise funds at a higher spread through fixed-priced 
issues than through floating-priced issues; the interest on these notes does not fluctuate 
and are typically protected to avoid the risk of rising interest rates. The RETAINED 
dummy variable is positive and insignificant, as expected. This finding indicates that 
no extra risk premium is associated with the retained interest relative to an ordinary 
loan tranche sold to other investors.  
 
5.1.C  Systemic Risk Characteristics 
The EMERGING dummy variable has a positive significant coefficient, 
indicating that lending to a borrower with collateral originated in emerging countries 
would increase spreads on average by 75.2 basis points. This is consistent with our 
prediction that borrowers view collateral originated in emerging countries as more 
risky.  
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 The CREDITOR RIGHTS index is positive and insignificant. The other legal 
risk variable, ENFORCEMENT, has a positive and insignificant coefficient as well. 
These insignificant signs may indicate that legal risk is already reflected in the credit 
rating of the issue. Finally, the CURRENCY RISK dummy variable has a positive 
relationship with spread. Although not significant, this finding suggests that a 
mismatch between the currency of the originating country on the one hand and the 
currency of the loan repayment on the other hand increases the rate charged on an 
average issue by 9.5 basis points. 
 
5.2 Regression Results: Conclusions 
Table 7 reports the adjusted R2 and F-test results of Regression #1 associated 
with the three main groups of explanatory variables that emerge as relevant to 
determine primary market spreads. These empirical results were analyzed to identify 
collateral and other pricing characteristics that affect the primary market.  
Insert Table 7 About Here 
Three main results emerge from this analysis. The first result shows that 
default and recovery risk characteristics form the most important group in explaining 
loan spread variability. We found evidence that on average the primary market spread 
for securitization issues with backing assets that cannot easily be replaced is 
significantly higher relative to issues with assets that can easily be obtained. 
Additionally, within the group of default and recovery risk characteristics, credit 
rating dummies are the most important variables to determine primary market spread: 
credit rating has an adjusted R2 of 0.61 (defined as R2c in Regression #1). The second 
result shows that systemic risk does not improve the adjusted R2 (from 0.70 to 0.69). 
Nevertheless, we found that issues originated in emerging markets tend to have 
significantly higher spreads than issues originated in developed countries. Thirdly, 
including marketability characteristics significantly improves the resulting adjusted 
R2, from 0.70 to 0.77. This result suggests that the marketability characteristics are the 
second most important group of explanatory variables to determine primary market 
spreads. 
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 6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, we estimated the variations of the specifications reported in 
column 1 of Table 6 in order to asses the robustness of the conclusions concerning the 
impact of collateral and other pricing characteristics on the primary market spread. 
Since we concluded that an increase in marketability over time would imply a 
narrowing of spreads over time, the first check of robustness investigated any 
temporal evolution in the relevant pricing factors that affected primary market spreads. 
Using a unique common sample could produce misleading results if investors 
evaluated loan tranches issued in these two periods differently or if they attributed a 
different relevance to common factors. We ran a separate regression for the sub-
sample between 1999 and 2001 (Regression #2) and those issued between 2002 and 
2005 (Regression #3 and #4).  
The second check of robustness was aimed at investigating which collateral 
and other pricing characteristics had a substantially different impact on the spread in a 
comparison between originators.  Using a unique common sample could produce 
misleading results if investors evaluated originators differently. This check was 
performed by running separate regressions for banks (Regression #5), finance houses 
(Regression #6) and finally corporates (regression #7 and #8). We restricted our 
analysis to banks, corporates and finance houses because the majority of issues in our 
sub-sample have been originated by banks (47.3%), corporates (21.5%) and finance 
houses (23.6%).  
Since a substantial number of issues is placed on euromarkets, the third check 
of robustness was aimed at investigating which collateral and other pricing 
characteristics had a substantially different impact on the spread in the comparison 
between the euromarket and other markets. Using a unique common sample could 
produce misleading results if investors evaluated these two types of markets 
differently. This check was performed by running separate regressions for the sub-
sample placed on the euromarket (Regression #9 and #10) and placed on other 
markets (Regression #11).  
Finally, a fourth check was performed by running an additional regression to 
investigate whether a different rating assigned by the three rating agencies (S&P, 
Moody’s, Fitch) had any statistically significant impact on spreads (Regression #12). 
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 6.1  Time of the Issue 
The first check of robustness investigated any temporal evolution in the 
relevant pricing factors affecting primary market spreads in the period 1999-2005. 
This check was performed by running separate regressions for the sub-sample of loan 
tranches issued in 1999-2001 and for those issued in the 2002-2005 period. Results of 
the period 1999-2001 are reported in Regression #2 of Table 6.  Because of severe 
correlation between the nature of the assets and the type of originator, two different 
specifications of the period 2002-2005 were compiled. The results of the period 2002-
2005 are reported in Regressions #3 and #4 of Table 6. 18 
Only few substantial differences emerge between the sub-samples, and these 
will be discussed below. The adjusted R2 of 0.78 for the 1999-2001 sub-sample 
(Regression #2) compared with 0.76 for the 2002-2005 sub-sample (Regression #4) 
indicates that the independent variables used in the regressions explain a similar 
portion of the spreads’ variability. Most CR dummies (credit rating) are statistically 
significant with the expected sign and have very similar coefficients for the three sub-
samples. However, the explanatory power of the rating dummy variables has 
decreased, as indicated by the lower R2c of the 2002-2005 sub-sample in comparison 
with the 1999-2001 sub-sample (0.51 versus 0.69). This result indicates that credit 
ratings may not provide unbiased assessments of expected default or recovery rates, 
and that this bias tends to be stronger in the 2002-2005 period. Furthermore, the 
BANK dummy variable has a weak positive significant coefficient in the 1999-2001 
period, and a negative and significant coefficient in the 2002-2005 period. This is 
most likely the result of investors changing their assessment from a relatively non-
favorable view to a more favorable one concerning the recovery rates for banks.  
Regarding the maturity of the issue, we found the dummy variable 
LOWMATURITY to be highly significant in the 1999-2001 sub-sample, and 
insignificant in the 2002-2005 sub-sample. We offer two possible explanations. As a 
first explanation, it could be that lenders perceived issues with a shorter maturity in 
the period 1999-2001 as less risky. 
                                                 
 
18  This empirical design was needed to solve severe correlation between some explanatory variables.  We do not report 
collinearity tests here in the interests of space, these results are available upon request.   It is however important to realize that 
Regression #3 does not employ type of originator (but with nature of the assets included) , and that Regression #4 does not 
employ nature of the assets (but with type of originator included).  
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 A second explanation may be that investors were relatively less familiar with 
asset -backed securities in the first period than in the second. This could have led 
investors to favor issues with a shorter maturity over issues with a relatively longer 
period, thereby demanding a lower spread on the shorter maturities.  
Other minor differences between the two periods - such as the statistical 
insignificance of a number of asset-type dummies within the 1999-2001 sub-sample 
and statistical significance within 2002-2005 - are most likely the consequence of the 
different composition of the sub-samples. Nevertheless, the signs of the coefficients 
are all similar in the two periods: whole business, for example, remains highly 
significant in both sub-samples.  Furthermore, the EUROMARKET dummy variable 
reports a strongly positive significant coefficient in the 2002-2005 sub-sample, and 
insignificant and positive in the 1999-2001 sub-sample. This may be explained by a 
strong increase over time in liquidity and credit standing of the Treasury issues in the 
euromarket relative to other markets.   
Finally, while the RETAINED dummy variable is insignificant in the period 
1999-2001, it is statistically highly significant in the period 2002-2005. Still, the 
coefficient and the level of significance decrease when the nature of the assets is 
included in the regression. Nevertheless, an issue that is retained by the originator 
reports a significant average increase of 81.0 basis points in the period 2002-2005. 
This could be explained by a higher perceived risk on the part of the originator due to 
increased experience in analyzing the default losses on the underlying collateral pool 
in time.  
 
6.2  Type of Originator 
The second check of robustness was aimed at investigating which collateral 
and other pricing characteristics had a substantially different impact on the spread in a 
comparison between originators.  This check was performed by running separate 
regressions for the sub-sample of banks (Regression #5), finance houses (Regression 
#6) and corporates (regression #7 and #8).19 Few substantial differences emerge 
between the sub-samples, and these will be discussed below. 
                                                 
 
19  Here, too, some categories were left out to solve severe correlation between some explanatory variables. It is important 
to realize that whole business and high maturity were severely correlated. For this reason, we estimated two regressions: 
Regression #7 without nature of assets (but with maturity included) and Regression #8 without maturity (but with nature of assets 
included).  
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 The adjusted R2 of 0.71 for banks (Regression #5) compared with the R2 of 
0.83 for finance houses (Regression #6) and compared with the 0.88 for corporates 
(Regression #7) indicates that the independent variables used in the regression explain 
a higher portion of the spread variability in the corporates and finance houses sub-
samples than in the banks sub-sample. This can be explained partly by the difference 
in explanatory power of the CR dummies (credit rating), as reflected in the adjusted 
R2c of 0.76 and 0.63 for the corporates and banks sub-samples respectively. We found 
no substantial difference in adjusted R2c between banks and finance houses: in both 
regressions, credit rating dummies explain approximately 0.64 of the spread 
variability. Although all rating dummies are significant, clearly, the rating dummies in 
the three sub-samples do not have very similar coefficients. These results may indicate 
that equally rated financial firms (banks and finance houses) and non-financial firms 
(corporates) are perceived by investors to have different default and recovery risk.  
Furthermore, no originator shows a stronger significant relationship between 
the LOWMATURITY dummy variable and the spread than banks do. Typical issues 
by banks with a maturity of less than 5 years reduce the spread significantly by 28.3 
basis points in comparison with issues with a maturity between 5-15 years. We also 
found the HIGHMATURITY dummy to be highly significant with a positive 
coefficient in the corporates sub-sample only. Lenders demand - on average - 49.8 
basis points more for corporate issues with a maturity greater than 15 years, and 22.1 
basis points less if the issue has a maturity less than 5 years. We can offer two 
explanations. First, assets of banks generally support debt better than corporate assets. 
Second, investors may find it more difficult to evaluate default and recovery rate in the 
case of corporate assets with a longer maturity, because there are institutional features 
(lower degree of information disclosure in comparison with banks, financial nature of 
corporate assets, etc.) that act to increase loan rates with a longer maturity and that 
decrease rates with a shorter maturity.   
With respect to the nature of the assets, we find most assets with similar 
coefficients and signs among originators, although there are two exceptions. The 
CREDIT CARD dummy is statistically highly significant with a negative coefficient 
in the banks sub-sample only, and the WHOLE BUSINESS dummy is statistically 
significant with a positive coefficient in the corporates sub-sample only. These 
differences are most likely the consequence of the different composition of the two 
sub-samples. Indeed, most of the credit card issues were originated by banks, and most 
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 of the whole business transactions were completed by corporates (see Table 3). Also, 
we find TRANSACTION SIZE weakly significant with a negative coefficient in the 
corporates and finance houses sub-samples, and insignificant and negative in the 
banks sub-sample. This negative and significant impact of transaction size on the 
spread could indicate that investors - on average - associate larger issues originated by 
corporates and finance houses with a positive price liquidity effect related to the size 
of the entire issue. Alternatively, it may simply be the case that larger issues by 
corporates and finance houses are funded more efficiently than could otherwise be 
arranged.  
The EUROMARKET dummy variable is insignificant in the bank sample, but 
positively significant in the corporates sample, and negatively significant in the 
finance houses sample. This could be explained by the fact that the loan tranches 
issued by finance houses in particular are originated in countries other than Europe. 
Thus, a difference in credit standing of the Treasury issues could explain why issues 
placed on the euromarket by finance houses have lower spreads than what was implied 
in their rating.  
Finally, the FIXED RATE dummy variable has a strong, significant coefficient 
in the corporates sub-sample, and an insignificant one in the banks and finance houses 
sub-samples. Lenders demand an average premium of up to 42.2 basis points for a 
fixed-rate security. Obviously, it is more likely for financial institutions to have a 
competitive advantage in managing the risk of rising interest rates in their portfolio 
more efficiently than corporates. Nevertheless, this result indicates that corporates 
have to pay a significantly higher spread through fixed-priced issues than through 
floating-priced issues in comparison with financial institutions. 
 
6.3 Type of Market 
The third check of robustness was aimed at investigating which collateral and 
other pricing characteristics have a substantially different impact on the spread in a 
comparison between the euromarket and other markets.  
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 This check was performed by running separate regressions for the sub-sample 
placed on the euromarket (Regression #9 and #10) and placed on other markets 
(Regression #11).20  
Once again, most CR dummies (credit rating) are statistically significant 
concerning the expected signs for all sub-samples, and they have very similar 
coefficients. The adjusted R2c of 0.61 for the euromarket sub-sample compared with 
0.63 for the other markets sub-sample indicates that the credit rating dummies used in 
the regressions explain a similar portion of the spreads’ variability. Furthermore, four 
substantial differences emerge between the three sub-samples. First, the BANK and 
SOVEREIGN dummy variables are highly significant with a negative coefficient in 
the euromarket sample only, and not significant in the other markets sample. This 
would seem to indicate that investors perceive loan tranches issued by banks and 
sovereign in the euromarket as less risky in comparison with those issued in other 
markets. In such cases, it might be that a higher degree of evaluation is inherent to 
issues in the euromarket, which is translated into a lower required risk premium by 
lenders.  
Second, most asset dummies are weakly significant in the other markets sub-
sample and highly significant in the euromarket. This is most likely the consequence 
of a different composition in the sub-samples and a lower availability of issues in 
other markets compared to the euromarket. Indeed, we found a substantially higher 
variation of assets included in the euromarket sub-sample and a lower availability of 
issues in other markets as is shown by the regression results in Table 6.  The question 
whether these other markets are less advanced than euromarkets remains unanswered. 
It merits greater in-depth analysis than we can provide here. 
Third, TRANSACTION SIZE is not statistically significant in the euromarket 
sub-sample, but it is significant with a positive coefficient in the other markets sub-
sample. This could indicate that investors - on average - associate larger transactions 
placed on markets other than the euromarket with lower ex-post liquidity.  
Fourth, while the FIXED dummy is statistically significant with the expected 
positive coefficient in the euromarket sub-sample, it is negatively significant in the 
                                                 
 
20  Here, too, some categories were left out. It is important to realize that nature of the assets and type of originator were 
severely correlated. For this reason, we estimated two regressions: Regression #9 without nature of assets (but with type of 
originator included) and Regression #10 without type of originator (but with nature of assets included).  
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 other markets. An explanation could be that lenders in other markets prefer fixed-
priced issues to control more efficiently for rising interest rates in comparison with 
lenders in the euromarket. As a result, lenders are willing to incur lower spreads for 
loans with fixed interest rates in these other markets than what was implied in their 
original credit rating. 
 
6.4  Discordance 
The final check of robustness concerned consistent use of credit ratings by 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and finally Fitch. The test we performed is very similar 
to the one presented in Gabbi and Sironi (2005). An additional regression (Regression 
#12) was run to see whether a different rating assigned by any of the three rating 
agencies had any statistically significant impact on loan issuance spreads. We included 
a DISCO dummy variable, which is one if the ratings assigned by different agencies 
have a different numerical value, and which is zero if the ratings assigned have the 
same value. A dummy variable of one is irrespective of whether the difference 
between credit ratings is equal to one or more notches. In both regressions (Regression 
#1 and #12), all CR dummies (credit rating) are statistically significant concerning the 
expected signs and have very similar coefficients.  
The disco dummy variable has a statistically significant negative coefficient, 
although it is very weak. This result indicates that rating agencies discordance leads to 
a lower loan spread (-11.1 basis points) in our sample. This finding suggests that 
investors interpreted the differences in credit rating by the agencies as an indication of 
a lower degree of uncertainty concerning default risk and recovery risk than what was 
implied in their original rating. 
 
6.5 Robustness Checks: Conclusions 
This subsection reports on several robustness checks performed upon our 
conclusions concerning the impact of collateral and other pricing characteristics on 
primary market spread. The coefficients and relevance associated with the nature of 
the assets dummy variables tend to be similar in most regressions.  
Indeed, the primary market spread for securitization issues with backing assets 
that cannot easily be replaced tends on average to be significantly higher relative to 
issues with assets that can easily be obtained. We found, for example, that whole 
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 business loans and future receivables show a dramatic and significant increase in the 
average spread relative to automobile loans. They are therefore considered more risky.  
Also, we saw that credit card receivables report a significant decrease in spread 
relative to automobile loans and that they are considered less risky. Furthermore, in 
our robustness checks dealing with the other pricing characteristics, we found few, but 
nevertheless important, differences among sub-samples that are of interest in pricing 
asset-backed securities.  
We focused our robustness analysis on four main areas.  In the first area, we 
investigated any temporal evolution in the relevant pricing factors that affect primary 
market spreads. We found substantial differences, dealing with the credit rating, 
impact of maturity, euromarket and retained interest on the spread. In the second area, 
we studied the question whether investors evaluate originators differently. We found 
substantial differences between originators, mainly in the impact of credit rating, 
maturity, transaction size and fixed rate on the spread.  In the third area, we focused 
on any differences in evaluation between euromarket and other markets, classified by 
investors. Here, we found substantial differences in the impact of issues originated by 
banks, transaction size and fixed rate on the spread. Finally, the fourth area deals with 
the consistent use of credit ratings. We found a very weak impact on the spread 
associated with the difference in credit rating by the agencies.  
In addition to the contribution towards the construction of a theory as 
described above, the value of this study lies not only in the questions it answers, but 
also in providing clear statements of questions that still need answering. In this regard, 
there are two potentially fruitful areas for further study. First, we would want to 
investigate the extent to which the determinants are influenced after issue.  
The objective in this study was to examine which determinants influence the 
primary market spreads of asset-backed securitization issues. This required the data to 
be gathered at the time of issue. The question then remains: did the issue change the 
determinants of the primary market spreads, and - more in particular - which 
determinants influence the secondary market spreads? It will be of paramount interest 
to explore these topics in future research projects. 
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 7. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to provide empirical evidence showing a 
relationship between the nature of the assets and the primary market spread. The 
model also provides predictions on how other pricing characteristics affect spread, 
since little is known about how and why spreads of asset-backed securities are 
influenced by loan tranche characteristics. Our sample represents a relatively large 
part of the asset-backed securitization issues (non-U.S.) booked in the international 
capital markets in the period 1999-2005 - 968 loans in total, with an aggregate value in 
excess of €178 billion.  
We find that default and recovery risk characteristics represent the most 
important group in explaining loan spread variability. Within this group, the credit 
rating dummies are the most important variables to determine loan spread at issue. 
Nonetheless, credit rating is not a sufficient statistic for the determination of spreads. 
We find that the nature of the assets has a substantial impact on the spread across all 
samples, indicating that primary market spread with backing assets that cannot easily 
be replaced is significantly higher relative to issues with assets that can easily be 
obtained. Of the remaining characteristics, only marketability explains a significant 
portion of the spreads’ variability.  
While most default and recovery characteristics - as measured by variables 
such as credit rating, loan to value, type of originator, enhancements, and nature of 
assets - represent relevant variables in explaining loan spread variability, systemic risk 
characteristics  - as measured by legal and currency risk - appear to be poor 
explanatory variables. The same poor results emerge for variables measuring 
marketability characteristics such as loan tranche size, transaction size, number of 
tranches, number of lead managers, number of credit rating agencies, tap issuance, and 
finally retained interest.  
In addition, variations of the specifications were estimated in order to asses the 
robustness of the conclusions concerning these determinants of loan spreads. We 
found few, but nevertheless important, differences among sub-samples that are of 
interest in pricing asset-backed securities. Three main results emerge from this 
analysis. First, empirical evidence indicates that credit ratings may not provide 
unbiased assessments of expected default or recovery rates.  
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 This bias tends to be stronger in the period 2002-2005. Second, the rating 
dummies in the sub-sample of banks, finance houses and corporates do not have very 
similar coefficients. These results may indicate that equally rated financial firms 
(banks and finance houses) and non-financial firms (corporates) are perceived by 
investors to have different default and recovery risk levels. Third, although we find 
very similar coefficients for most of the variables associated with the issues placed on 
euromarkets and other markets, we find in our sample less variation of types of 
originators and nature of underlying assets in other markets in comparison with 
euromarkets. The question whether these other markets are less advanced than 
euromarkets remains unanswered. 
To our knowledge, ours is the first full-scale empirical analysis of how asset-
backed securities are priced. It has been demonstrated that the determinants of primary 
market spreads are relevant for different financial market participants. Financial 
institutions and corporations wishing to raise funds in the asset-backed markets may 
obtain reasonable estimates of the average spread that they would face. Also, rating 
agencies may obtain empirical information about the way their credit risk evaluations 
are perceived by investors. Whether the determinants of primary market spreads 
change after the issue will be of interest to explore in future research projects. 
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 TABLE 1 
Key pricing characteristics of ABS full sample compared with ABS sub-sample  
(1) Variable of interest (4) Surv. Rate
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
dependent variable:
primary market spread (bp) 1,472 99.2 133.1 968 84.9 103.3 65.8%
independent variables:
default and recovery risk characteristics:
credit rating class [1-21 weak] 1,939 3.9 3.5 968 3.9 3.4 49.9%
loan to value (%) 1,556 18.0% 24.1% 968 19.9 25.2% 62.2%
type of originator:
■ bank 2,289 47.3% - 968 58.7% - 42.3%
■ corporate 2,289 21.5% - 968 16.7% - 42.3%
■ finance house 2,289 23.6% - 968 15.2% - 42.3%
■ insurance company 2,289 0.7% - 968 0.2% - 42.3%
■ public entity 2,289 5.2% - 968 7.0% - 42.3%
■ sovereign 2,289 1.5% - 968 2.2% - 42.3%
maturity (years) 2,118 11.3 9.8 968 14.0 10.1 45.7%
loans with credit enhancement 2,427 7.6% - 968 8.9% - 39.9%
nature of assets:
■ aircraft leases 2,427 1.7% - 968 0.7% - 39.9%
■ automobile loans 2,427 17.2% - 968 15.1% - 39.9%
■ consumer loans 2,427 7.7% - 968 9.8% - 39.9%
■ credit card receivables 2,427 7.5% - 968 8.2% - 39.9%
■ equipment leases 2,427 13.3% - 968 13.4% - 39.9%
■ future receivables 2,427 3.0% - 968 0.1% - 39.9%
■ other loans 2,427 24.5% - 968 15.5% - 39.9%
■ small business loans 2,427 14.5% - 968 20.0% - 39.9%
■ whole business loans 2,427 10.9% - 968 15.9% - 39.9%
marketability characteristics:
time of the issue: 
■ period I (1999-2002) 2,427 52.9% - 968 58.2% - 39.9%
■ period I (2003-2005) 2,427 47.1% - 968 41.8% - 39.9%
loan tranche size (Euro millions) 2,417 150.3 305.1 968 177.8 304.4 40.0%
transaction size (Euro millions) 765 475.1 640.1 221 675.3 768.2 28.9%
number of tranches 765 3.2 3.1 221 3.6 2.5 28.9%
type of primary market:
■ euromarket 2,427 51.1% - 968 84.0% - 39.9%
■ other markets 2,427 49.9% - 968 16.0% - 39.9%
number of lead managers 2,417 1.4 0.7 968 1.5 0.7 40.0%
number of credit rating agencies 2,207 3.8 0.8 968 4.0 0.7 43.9%
tap issue 2,427 2.1% - 968 3.1% - 39.9%
retained issue 2,427 4.9% - 968 1.7% - 39.9%
type of interest rate:
■ loans with fixed rate 2,034 41.4% - 968 21.6% - 47.6%
■ loans with floating rate 2,034 58.6% - 968 78.4% - 47.6%
(2) ABS full sample (3) ABS sub-sample
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 TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) 
Key pricing characteristics of ABS full sample compared with ABS sub-sample 
(1) Variable of interest (4) Surv. Rate
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
(2) ABS full sample (3) ABS sub-sample
 
systemic risk characteristics:
country of origin:
■ emerging countries 2,076 13.6% - 968 1.0% - 46.6%
■ developed countries 2,076 86.4% - 968 99.0% - 46.6%
LLSV creditor rights [0-4 strong] 2,094 2.4 1.0 968 2.4 1.1 46.2%
LLSV enforcement [0-50 strong] 2,094 43.1 5.1 968 43.9 4.0 46.2%
currency risk 2,234 13.3% - 968 8.8% - 43.3%
 
Column 1 represents the pricing variables. Column 2 presents number, mean, and standard deviation associated with 
each pricing variable in the full sample. Column 3 presents number, mean, and standard deviation associated with each pricing 
variable in the sub-sample. Column 4 presents the survival rate for each variable. The survival rate is calculated as the number of 
issues in the full sample divided by the number of issues in the sub-sample. 
 
 
Source: Structured Finance International; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
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 TABLE 2 
Credit rating scales 
 
Moody's
Standard & 
Poor's Fitch
Value
1 Aaa AAA AAA
2 Aa1 AA+ AA+
3 Aa2 AA AA
4 Aa3 AA- AA-
5 A1 A+ A+
6 A2 A A
7 A3 A- A-
8 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+
9 Baa2 BBB BBB
10 Baa3 BBB- BBB-
11 Ba1 BB+ BB+
12 Ba2 BB BB
13 Ba3 BB- BB-
14 B1 B+ B+
15 B2 B B
16 B3 B- B-
17 Caa1 CCC+ CCC+
18 Caa2 CCC+ CCC+
19 Caa3 CCC- CCC-
20 - CC CC
21 - D D
Rating agency
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TABLE 3 
Asset securitization issues by class categorized by type of originator 
 
Corporate Bank 
Finance 
house Sovereign
Public 
entity
Insurance 
company
Not 
identified
Total, All 
items
ABS
 aircraft leases 13 9 18 0 0 0 0 40
 automobile loans 72 143 160 0 0 0 43 418
 consumer loans 22 143 16 0 0 0 5 186
 credit card receivables 23 136 14 0 0 0 9 182
 equipment leases 7 97 187 0 0 0 31 322
 future receivables 63 1 0 5 3 0 0 72
 other 142 199 137 26 24 19 45 592
 small business loans 0 346 0 0 0 0 5 351
 whole business loans 149 9 9 4 93 0 0 264
Total 491 1,083 541 35 120 19 138 2,427
# Asset securitization issues categorized by type of originator
 
 
Source: Structured Finance International.
 TABLE 4 
Creditor rights around the world 
 
This table classifies countries by legal origin (see La Porta et al., 2000). We used five creditor rights 
variables in this analysis, and added up the scores to create a creditor right index. This index runs from 
0 (weak protection) to 4 (strong protection). 
 
Variable of interest    
(1)
No automatic stay on 
assets (2)
Secured creditors first 
paid (3)
Restrictions for going into 
reorganizations (4)
Management does not stay in 
reorganization (5)
Creditor rights index 
(6)
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0
Peru 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0
France 0 0 0 0 0
Argentina 0 1 0 0 1
Brazil 0 0 1 0 1
Greece 0 0 0 1 1
Portugal 0 1 0 0 1
Ireland 0 1 0 0 1
Australia 0 1 0 0 1
U.S. 0 1 0 0 1
Canada 0 1 0 0 1
Finland 0 1 0 0 1
Switzerland 0 1 0 0 1
Turkey 0 1 1 0 2
Uruguay 0 1 0 1 2
Chile 0 1 1 0 2
Spain 1 1 0 0 2
Italy 0 1 1 0 2
Taiwan 1 1 0 0 2
Japan 0 1 0 1 2
Belgium 1 1 0 0 2
Sweden 0 1 1 0 2
Netherlands 0 1 1 0 2
Norway 0 1 1 0 2
Sri Lanka 1 0 1 1 3
Thailand 1 1 0 1 3
South Africa 0 1 1 1 3
South Korea 1 1 0 1 3
Germany 1 1 1 0 3
Austria 1 1 1 0 3
New Zealand 1 0 1 1 3
Denmark 1 1 1 0 3
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 4
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 4
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 4
Egypt 1 1 1 1 4
Zimbabwe 1 1 1 1 4
Kenya 1 1 1 1 4
Ecuador 1 1 1 1 4
India 1 1 1 1 4
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 4
Israel 1 1 1 1 4
Hong Kong 1 1 1 1 4
Singapore 1 1 1 1 4
U.K. 1 1 1 1 4
Jordan na na na na na
Venezuela na 1 na na na
 
 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
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TABLE 5 
Enforcement around the world 
 
This table classifies countries by legal origin (see La Porta et al., 2000). We used five enforcement 
variables in this analysis, and added up the scores to create an enforcement index. This index runs from 
0 (weak enforcement) to 50 (strong enforcement). 
Variable of interest      
(1)
Efficiency of judicial 
system (2)
Rule of law         
(3)
Corruption             
(4)
Risk of expropriation 
(5)
Risk of contract 
repudiation (6)
Enforcement index      
(7)
Philippines 4.75 2.73 2.92 5.22 4.8 20.42
Pakistan 5 3.03 2.98 5.62 4.87 21.5
Indonesia 2.5 3.98 2.15 7.16 6.09 21.88
Nigeria 7.25 2.73 3.03 5.33 4.36 22.7
Peru 6.75 2.5 4.7 5.54 4.68 24.17
Sri Lanka 7 1.9 5 6.05 5.25 25.2
Egypt 6.5 4.17 3.87 6.3 6.05 26.89
Zimbabwe 7.5 3.68 5.42 5.61 5.04 27.25
Turkey 4 5.18 5.18 7 5.95 27.31
Kenya 5.75 5.42 4.82 5.98 5.66 27.63
Argentina 6 5.35 6.02 5.91 4.91 28.19
Colombia 7.25 2.08 5 6.95 7.02 28.3
Jordan 8.66 4.35 5.48 6.07 4.86 29.42
Thailand 3.25 6.25 5.18 7.42 7.57 29.67
Ecuador 6.25 6.67 5.18 6.57 5.18 29.85
Mexico 6 5.35 4.77 7.29 6.55 29.96
Uruguay 6.5 5 5 6.58 7.29 30.37
India 8 4.17 4.58 7.75 6.11 30.61
Venezuela 6,5 6.37 4.7 6.89 6.3 30.76
Brazil 5.75 6.32 6.32 7.62 6.3 32.31
South Africa 6 4.42 8.92 6.88 7.27 33.49
South Korea 6 5.35 5.3 8.31 8.59 33.55
Chile 7.25 7.02 5.3 7.5 6.8 33.87
Greece 7 6.18 7.27 7.12 6.62 34.19
Malaysia 9 6.78 7.38 7.95 7.43 38.54
Israel 10 4.82 8.33 8.25 7.54 38.94
Portugal 5.5 8.68 7.38 8.9 8.57 39.03
Spain 6.25 7.8 7.38 9.52 8.4 39.35
Italy 6.75 8.33 6.13 9.35 9.17 39.73
Taiwan 6.75 8.52 6.18 9.12 9.16 40.4
Ireland 8.75 7.8 8.52 9.67 8.96 43.7
Hong Kong 10 8.22 8.52 8.29 8.82 43.85
France 8 8.98 9.05 9.65 9.19 44.87
Singapore 10 8.57 8.22 9.3 8.86 44.95
Australia 10 10 8.52 9.27 8.71 46.5
Germany 9 9.23 8.93 9.9 9.77 46.83
Japan 10 8.98 8.52 9.67 9.69 46.87
U.K. 10 8.57 9.1 9.71 9.63 47.01
Austria 9.5 10 8.57 9.69 9.6 47.36
Belgium 9.5 10 8.82 9.63 9.48 47.43
U.S. 10 10 8.63 9.98 9 47.61
Canada 9.25 10 10 9.67 8.96 47.88
Finland 10 10 10 9.67 9.15 48.82
New Zealand 10 10 10 9.69 9.29 48.98
Sweden 10 10 10 9.4 9.58 48.98
Denmark 10 10 10 9.67 9.31 48.98
Netherlands 10 10 10 9.98 9.35 49.33
Norway 10 10 10 9.88 9.71 49.59
Switzerland 10 10 10 9.98 9.98 49.96
 
 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
 
 
 
 TABLE 6  
Ordinary least squares regression analyses of asset-backed securities  
OLS 1999-01 2002-05 2002-05 Banks
Finance 
houses
Corpo-
rates
Corpo-
rates
Euro-
market
Euro-
market
Other 
markets
Discor-
dance
Variable Reg. #1 Reg. #2 Reg. #3 Reg. #4 Reg. #5 Reg. #6 Reg. #7 Reg. #8 Reg. #9 Reg.#10 Reg. #11 Reg. #12
CONSTANT -29.11 -108.03 125.27 192.09 ** -98.78 305.04 * 291.62 * 287.05 ** 24.12 14.84 -168.08 -44.04
(-0.51) (-1.36) (-0.02) (1.77) (-1.58) (2.79) (2.81) (2.33) (0.44) (0.29) (-1.45) (-0.75)
CR = 3 and 4 28.44 * 32.07 * 21.23 ** 10.79 23.32 * 36.16 * 56.03 * 56.17 * 37.12 * 27.37 * 20.77 29.94 *
(4.88) (3.66) (2.09) (1.11) (3.87) (3.03) (4.48) (3.65) (6.19) (4.59) (0.55) (5.10)
CR = 5 and 6 51.60 * 51.22 * 43.63 * 30.79 * 51.38 * 28.12 * 71.79 * 47.58 * 66.37 * 53.82 * 34.21 * 53.99 *
(8.43) (6.72) (3.48) (3.33) (7.71) (4.30) (7.65) (4.33) (10.89) (7.40) (3.07) (8.42)
CR = 7 and 8 78.75 * 89.67 * 66.60 * 64.78 * 104.03 * 64.37 * 113.02 * 115.62 * 93.32 * 81.83 * 34.48 82.31 *
(5.65) (3.79) (3.79) (4.69) (4.68) (2.01) (5.48) (5.31) (5.63) (5.15) (1.39) (5.64)
CR = 9 and 10 146.25 * 144.09 * 136.65 * 120.20 * 139.18 * 79.03 * 198.98 * 173.81 * 163.94 * 151.57 * 100.75 * 147.94 *
(17.33) (13.86) (8.58) (9.78) (15.76) (4.31) (11.76) (9.69) (19.76) (15.75) (6.46) (17.52)
CR = 11 and 12 367.51 * 368.60 * 370.69 * 322.23 * 347.15 * 355.59 * 520.55 * 505.56 * 389.47 * 378.82 * 303.84 * 369.02 *
(12.53) (10.09) (7.54) (7.61) (9.92) (5.27) (14.61) (13.15) (12.27) (12.03) (3.63) (12.67)
CR = 13 and 14 389.53 * na 381.61 * 386.95 * 386.87 ** na 514.52 * 498.69 * 428.84 * 396.35 * na 393.73 *
(3.58) na (3.30) (3.63) (2.27) na (30.79) (22.04) (4.17) (3.64) na (3.61)
LOAN TO VALUE -24.81 * -20.93 ** -25.44 * -49.92 * -11.99 -15.11 * -2.70 -18.25 -11.54 -18.91 ** -7.46 -25.09 *
(-3.77) (-1.98) (-2.91) (-4.60) (-1.21) (-4.10) (-0.24) (-1.43) (-1.40) (-2.23) (-0.97) (-3.84)
FINANCE HOUSE -17.37 ** 0.75 - excl. - - - - -41.10 * - excl. -17.57 **
(-2.41) (0.07) - excl. - - - - (-4.62) - excl. (-2.42)
BANK -2.93 15.72 *** - -58.15 * - - - - -32.97 * - 1.33 -1.93
(-0.40) (1.89) - (-5.61) - - - - (-4.29) - (0.16) (-0.26)
INSURANCE 112.88 * 72.61 * - 195.83 * - - - - 98.46 * - na 120.36 *
(2.89) (4.04) - (3.53) - - - - (2.34) - na (3.11)
PUBLIC -3.29 -15.33 - 21.61 - - - - 5.38 - na -3.58
(-0.32) (-1.65) - (1.03) - - - - (0.57) - na (-0.35)
SOVEREIGN -29.93 ** -27.68 ** - -20.94 - - - - -25.82 *** - -100.54 -30.52 **
(-2.44) (-2.00) - (-1.32) - - - - (-1.85) - (-1.48) (-2.47)
LOWMATURITY -10.29 -25.57 * 8.98 -3.83 -28.33 * 11.20 -22.21 *** - -3.66 -20.54 -7.33 -9.36
(-1.29) (-3.26) (0.59) (-0.20) (-2.77) (1.30) (-1.95) - (-0.25) (-1.50) (-0.93) (-1.21)
HIGHMATURITY 10.75 ** 11.69 *** 19.63 18.49 ** -1.62 7.67 49.80 * - 16.88 * 12.85 ** na 10.80 **
(2.01) (1.91) (1.49) (2.13) (-0.22) (1.01) (4.30) - (3.51) (2.25) na (2.03)
ENHANCEMENT -22.14 * -27.80 * -12.81 -20.78 ** -15.38 ** -26.01 *** 6.01 -8.83 -15.22 * -21.00 * -89.94 * -22.01 *
(-4.31) (-3.61) (-1.35) (-1.97) (-2.31) (-1.87) (0.57) (-0.73) (-2.72) (-3.79) (-2.74) (-4.27)  
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 TABLE 6 (CONTINUED) 
Ordinary least squares regression analyses of asset-backed securities  
OLS 1999-01 2002-05 2002-05 Banks
Finance 
houses
Corpo-
rates
Corpo-
rates
Euro-
market
Euro-
market
Other 
markets
Discor-
dance
Variable Reg. #1 Reg. #2 Reg. #3 Reg. #4 Reg. #5 Reg. #6 Reg. #7 Reg. #8 Reg. #9 Reg.#10 Reg. #11 Reg. #12
CONSUMER 9.70 ** -2.72 24.45 * - 6.91 - - 12.85 - 11.19 ** 8.65 10.21 **
(2.15) (-0.49) (2.65) - (1.29) - - (1.11) - (2.50) (0.55) (2.23)
CREDIT CARD -16.81 ** -19.60 *** -10.69 - -24.55 * - - 13.71 - -12.73 *** -18.57 *** -18.47 **
(-2.29) (-1.94) (-1.10) - (-2.88) - - (0.73) - (-1.95) (-1.83) (-2.54)
FUTURE 42.03 * 60.52 * 33.70 - na - - 25.22 *** - 42.94 * na 41.37 *
(4.34) (5.08) (1.46) - na - - (1.97) - (4.03) na (4.29)
AIRCRAFT LEASE 37.58 * 75.03 * 31.13 - na - - 21.69 - 38.59 * na 39.65 *
(2.71) (4.68) (1.42) - na - - (1.23) - (2.98) na (2.82)
EQUIPMENT LEASE 16.71 * 16.30 * 9.55 - 6.56 - - 13.06 - 11.49 ** -46.00 *** 17.26 *
(3.80) (2.71) (1.36) - (1.08) - - (1.50) - (2.06) (-1.83) (3.88)
OTHER 36.27 * 43.22 * 24.91 ** - 51.46 * - - 40.00 * - 34.53 * -25.37 36.20 *
(6.42) (5.46) (2.14) - (6.36) - - (2.60) - (5.85) (-0.96) (6.37)
SMALL BUSINESS 8.10 -1.40 7.69 - 7.28 - - -13.97 - 8.26 3.60 7.85
(0.85) (-0.14) (0.36) - (0.71) - - (-0.54) - (0.89) (0.09) (0.83)
WHOLE BUSINESS 61.56 * 79.66 * 65.89 * - 18.47 - - 69.38 * - 65.43 * -17.64 60.03 *
(5.21) (6.91) (3.57) - (0.25) - - (5.43) - (7.18) (-0.67) (5.06)
PERIOD II -8.23 *** - - - -7.31 -10.05 ** -5.75 -10.60 -9.42 ** -7.12 -0.75 -7.35 ***
(-1.94) - - - (-1.39) (-2.17) (-0.53) (-0.88) (-2.08) (-1.50) (-0.11) (-1.76)
LOAN SIZE 8.00 3.85 8.02 0.43 5.27 - - - 14.97 * 7.50 3.15 7.35
(1.54) (0.57) (0.75) (0.06) (0.88) - - - (2.84) (1.18) (0.35) (1.42)
TRANSACTION SIZE -7.25 5.33 -22.76 -37.35 ** -1.03 -21.41 ** -34.32 ** -35.67 ** -14.26 -11.87 26.47 ** -5.77
(-0.77) (0.47) (-1.39) (-2.45) (-0.10) (-2.46) (-2.48) (-2.11) (-1.45) (-1.13) (2.00) (-0.62)
# TRANCHES -0.35 0.09 -0.84 - 0.29 -0.47 - - -0.08 -0.96 - -0.36
(-0.66) (0.06) (-1.23) - (0.24) (-1.44) - - (-0.11) (-1.28) - (-0.67)
EUROMARKET 14.10 * 7.10 6.62 * 56.85 * 14.51 -7.37 ** 19.88 ** 32.92 ** - - - 13.93 *
(2.77) (0.70) (3.62) (5.02) (1.57) (-2.28) (2.03) (2.27) - - - (2.77)
# LEAD MANAGERS -7.79 ** -8.89 ** -4.44 -5.37 -4.33 - - - -9.38 * -9.81 * - -8.17 **
(-2.23) (-2.57) (-0.63) (-0.82) (-1.28) - - - (-2.86) (-2.71) - (-2.38)
# RATING AGENCIES -0.72 -0.43 3.32 -1.42 -2.46 - 0.83 -0.50 -1.08 -0.15 - 0.90
(-0.18) (-0.09) (0.50) (-0.27) (-0.50) - (0.08) (-0.05) (-0.25) (-0.03) - (0.23)
TAP 0.86 3.28 11.62 -11.10 5.45 na 2.42 -1.37 3.84 0.50 na 1.14
(0.10) (0.39) (0.62) (-0.51) (0.65) na (0.20) (-0.11) (0.42) (0.06) na (0.13)  
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 TABLE 6(CONTINUED) 
Ordinary least squares regression analyses of asset-backed securities  
 
OLS 1999-01 2002-05 2002-05 Banks
Finance 
houses
Corpo-
rates
Corpo-
rates
Euro-
market
Euro-
market
Other 
markets
Discor-
dance
Variable Reg. #1 Reg. #2 Reg. #3 Reg. #4 Reg. #5 Reg. #6 Reg. #7 Reg. #8 Reg. #9 Reg.#10 Reg. #11 Reg. #12
 
23.96 21.53 * 31.66 * 18.34 ** 5.39 1.07 * 42.18 * 26.50 * 24.25 * ** 22.12 *FIXED -5.00 -57.66
(4.48) (3.97) (2.17) (0.62) (0.12) (-0.02) (2.77) (4.37) (3.98) (3.90) (-2.28) (4.52)
11.18 42.93 ** 80.98 * 23.71 107.53 ** 9.63RETAINED -19.12 na na na na na
(0.78) (-0.66) (2.05) (3.54) (1.27) (2.46) na na na na na (0.67)
EMERGING 75.18 ** 105.58 *** 88.35 *** 54.97 50.45 113.33 73.95 ** 76.04 * 86.62 *** 67.83 55.91 73.06 **
(2.18) (1.91) (1.89) (1.57) (0.82) (1.24) (2.46) (2.63) (1.74) (1.38) (1.46) (2.10)
CREDITOR RIGHTS 1.40 -2.45 - 4.61 -0.71 -1.60 - - - - - 1.84
(0.52) (-0.63) - (1.11) (-0.18) (-0.53) - - - - - (0.71)
ENFORCEMENT 1.19 1.19 2.81 3.92 ** 2.20 *** -1.78 - - 1.22 1.46 - 1.19
(1.19) (1.08) (1.17) (2.00) (1.83) (-1.51) - - (1.47) (1.51) - (1.20)
CURRENCY RISK 9.49 25.46 * -13.86 -40.91 12.24 20.30 7.96 17.19 *** -5.17 16.52 *** -67.00 10.72
(1.00) (2.75) (-0.42) (-1.56) (0.81) (1.61) (1.02) (1.79) (-0.56) (1.80) (-1.61) (1.13)
DISCO - - - - - - - - - - - -11.06 ***
(-1.79)
Number of observations 968 549 413 333 604 183 199 202 813 831 94 968
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.71 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.75 0.76 0.85 0.76
Adjusted R2c 0.61 0.69 0.54 0.51 0.63 0.64 0.76 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.61
F R2 84.71 56.25 42.11 40.93 49.85 47.05 79.22 54.82 92.19 90.15 24.76 82.87
F R2c 296.88 288.41 83.27 34.00 215.02 89.70 127.44 127.44 188.92 188.92 49.61 296.88
 
The dependent variable is defined as the difference between the margins yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding benchmark in basis points. The independent variables 
are as follows: CR (credit rating), set of rating dummy variables that correspond to credit rating 1-2 (CR=1-2), 3-4 (CR=3-4), 5-6 (CR=5-6), 7-8 (CR=7-8), 9-10 (CR=9-10), 11-12 (CR=11-12), 
and 13-14 (CR=13-14); LOAN TO VALUE is the subordination level expressed as a percentage of the transaction’s initial principal balance; set of originator dummy variables:  FINANCE 
HOUSE are finance house loans; BANK are bank loans; INSURANCE include those loans made by financial institutions that primarily sell insurance; PUBLIC are those loans originated by 
any state or local government; SOVEREIGN are sovereign loans; LOWMATURITY is 1 if the issue matures in les than 5 years; HIGHMATURITY is 1 if loan matures after 15 years; 
ENHANCEMENT dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the issue has a third-party guarantee in the form of an insurance policy issued by one of the monoline insurance companies; set of 
collateral dummy variables: CONSUMER are consumer loans; CREDIT CARD are credit card loans; FUTURE are future receivables; AIRCRAFT LEASE are leases-aircraft; EQUIPMENT 
LEASE are leases-equipment; SMALL BUSINESS are small-business loans; WHOLE BUSINESS are whole-business loans; OTHER are other loans; PERIOD II dummy variable of 1 that 
corresponds to the loan issued in the 2002-2005 period, zero if the loan was issued in the period 1999-2001; LOAN SIZE is the natural log of the issue amount in millions of Euros; 
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TRANSACTION SIZE is the natural log of the size of the transaction in Euro millions; # TRANCHES is the number of tranches per transaction; EUROMARKET has a dummy of 1 if the loan 
issued is placed on the euromarket, zero if the loan is placed on other markets; # LEAD MANAGERS is the number of managers representing the number of financial institutions participating 
in the loan issuance management group; # RATING AGENCIES is the number of rating agencies involved in rating the loan at the time of issuance; TAP dummy variable of 1 if the issue 
corresponds to a tap issue; FIXED has a dummy of 1 if the loan issue has a rate which is fixed for the life of the loan, zero if the loan has an interest rate that fluctuates depending on the base 
interest rate (floating rate issue); RETAINED is the retained subordinated interest as a beneficial interest in a securitization transaction by the originator; EMERGING has a dummy of 1 if the 
issue is originated in an emerging country, zero otherwise; CREDITOR RIGHTS and ENFORCEMENT measure the legal strength of the issue by country of origin; ENFORCEMENT 
measures the strength of a country's legal system; CURRENCY RISK dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if currency risk occurs. The table shows the coefficient and t-statistic, corrected 
for heteroscedasticity, in parentheses. * and ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Source: Structured Finance International; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (2000). 
 
 TABLE 7 
Adjusted R2 for different specifications of Regression #1 
 
Independent variables adjusted R2 F-test
all characteristics 0.76 84.71
default and recovery risk characteristics 0.70 109.67
marketability characteristics 0.13 20.41
systemic characteristics 0.07 22.88
default and recovery risk + marketability characteristics 0.77 106.51
default and recovery risk + systemic characteristics 0.69 82.14
marketability characteristics + systemic characteristics 0.19 20.88
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